Unfair Trade Practices Legislation: Symbolism and Substance in Consumer Protection by Belobaba, Edward P.
Osgoode Hall Law Journal
Volume 15, Number 2 (October 1977) Article 3
Unfair Trade Practices Legislation: Symbolism and
Substance in Consumer Protection
Edward P. Belobaba
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj
Article
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Osgoode Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Osgoode Hall
Law Journal by an authorized editor of Osgoode Digital Commons.
Citation Information
Belobaba, Edward P.. "Unfair Trade Practices Legislation: Symbolism and Substance in Consumer Protection." Osgoode Hall Law
Journal 15.2 (1977) : 327-388.
http://digitalcommons.osgoode.yorku.ca/ohlj/vol15/iss2/3
UNFAIR TRADE PRACTICES
LEGISLATION:
SYMBOLISM AND SUBSTANCE
IN
CONSUMER PROTECTION
By EDWARD P. BELOBABA*-
There is a widespread assumption that legislation, once adopted, disposes of a
problem. It is a view that serves the purposes of governments, for legislation
creates an image of concern and response. And it costs very little. Nevertheless,
it is often an erroneous view. 1
CONTENTS
A. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 328
1. Introduction 328
2. The Provincial Trade Practices Legislation 329
3. The American Influence 331
B. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE PROVINCIAL
LEGISLATION 334
1. Application and Scope 334
2. The Prohibited Practices 345
3. The Range of Private Remedies 356
4. The Administrative Remedies 365
5. The Criminal Sanction 372
C. EVALUATION AND SOME PROPOSALS FOR REFORM 375
1. Drafting the Legislation: Six Areas of Concern 375
2. Enforcing the Legislation: Lessons from B.C. and Ontario 379
D. RETHINKING TRADE PRACTICES REGULATION:
AN ALTERNATIVE 381
E. CONCLUSION 386
0 Copyright, 1977, Edward P. Belobaba.
Professor Belobaba is Assistant Professor of Law, Osgoode Hal Law School,
York University. The author gratefully acknowledges the research assistance of Marc S.
Freedman, member of the 1977 graduating class of Osgoode Hall Law School.
IZiegel, The Future of Canadian Consumerism (1973), 51 Can. B. Rev. 191 at 198.
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
A. INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW
1. Introduction
Protecting the consumer against unfair and deceptive business practices
has been a matter of intermittent governmental concern for several centuries.2
In Canada, sporadic federal and provincial consumer-oriented legislative ini-
tiatives have resulted in fragmentary and disparate consumer protection laws.8
However, a concerted legislative effort to provide a more comprehensive
regulatory approach has recently materialized. Omnibus consumer trade prac-
tices legislation has now been enacted by at least three provincial legislatures4
and there are indications that other provinces will soon follow their lead.5
This increased legislative activity on behalf of the Canadian consumer
has not been confined to the provinces. The federal government, having re-
cently implemented the Phase I amendments to the Combines Investigation
Act,6 is continuing to show keen interest in the area of consumer unfair trade
practices. Several studies released by the federal Department of Consumer and
Corporate Affairs reflect the federal government's commitment to consumer
protection at the national level. One such study provides an excellent analysis
2 In 1481, for example, King Louis XI of France achieved an oft-forgotten stature
as a mediaeval consumer advocate when he promulgated the following legislative edict:
Anyone who sells butter containing stones or other things [to add to the weight]
will be put into our pillory; then the said butter will be placed on his head and
left until entirely melted by the sun. Dogs may come and lick him and people
offend him with whatever defamatory epithets they please without offence to God
or the King.
Quoted in Breeden and Lovett, Louisiands New Unfair Trade Practice and Consumer
Protection Law (1973), 20 La. BJ. 307, n.4. A concise history of consumer protection
efforts from biblical times onwards is provided in Geis and Edelhertz, Criminal Law
and Consumer Fraud: A Sociological View (1972-73), 11 Am. Crim. L.R. 989 at
989-996.
3 At the federal level, the Combines Investigation Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. C-23, as
amended by S.C. 1975, c. 76, provides some regulation of misleading advertising,
double-ticketing, pyramid and referral selling, bait and switch sales practices and
promotional contests. See generally Ziegel, Recent Developments in Consumer Law
(Toronto: Canadian Bar Association, 1976) at 2-10. Also see Cohen, Bill C-7: Its
Proposed Amendments to the Law of False Advertising (1974), 13 Can. P.R. (N.S.)
197. The consumer protection efforts at the provincial level have generally been directed
at particularized marketplace abuses, e.g., door-to-door sales methods, truth-in-lending
disclosures, and registration schemes. For an example of the former, see the Ontario
Consumer Protection Act, infra, note 89. For examples of the latter see the registration
statutes itemized, infra, note 295.
4 The British Columbia Trade Practices Act, S.B.C. 1974, c. 96 (as amended by
S.B.C. 1975, c. 80); the Ontario Business Practices Act, S.O. 1974, c. 131; and the
Alberta Unfair Trade Practices Act, S.A. 1975, c. 33 (as amended by S.A. 1976, c. 54).
5 "It is rumoured that Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Quebec, and Newfoundland are
not far behind." Cohen and Ziegel, The Political and Constitutional Basis for a New
Trade Practices Act (Ottawa, Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, Bureau
of Competition Policy, 1976) at 7. Hereinafter the Cohen and Ziegel Study.6 R.S.C. 1970, c. 0-23. The Phase I amendments were enacted as An Act to
Amend the Combines Investigation Act 1975, S.C. 1975 c. 76. See generally Kaiser,
The New Competition Law: Stage One, (1976), 1 C.B.LJ. 147. At time of writing the
second stage amendments had just been introduced; see Globe and Mail, March 17,
1977 at 1.
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of the regulation of misleading and unfair trade practices; 7 another evaluates
the political and constitutional basis for federal legislative involvement; 8 and
a third considers the question of federal-provincial relations in the consumer
protection field.9 The nature and extent of these suggested federal initiatives
with respect to the regulation of consumer trade practices are issues that will
undoubtedly prove to be of continuing interest to students of consumer and
constitutional law. Before any satisfactory evaluation of the regulatory poten-
tial of a dual-jurisdictional approach to trade practices regulation can be made,
however, attention must be directed to a critical analysis of the recent provin-
cial efforts.
This article attempts such a critique. Its primary purpose is to provide
both a comparative analysis and a critical evaluation of the recently enacted
provincial trade practices statutes. An underlying motivation for this fairly
extensive statutory analysis is the realization that symbolic or "name-only"
legislation, particularly in the area of consumer protection, is frequently con-
fused with substantive reform.10 The challenge for the proponents of Canadian
consumerism is to be alert to those legislative efforts that provide nothing
more than symbolic protection. In my view, the recent provincial trade prac-
tices legislation provides valuable lessons in this regard. These lessons are
relevant not only to consumers generally, but to the legislative draftsmen who
would undoubtedly agree with Professor Leff's observation that "it is easy to
say nothing with words.""
2. The Provincial Trade Practices Legislation
It was only three years ago that British Columbia became the first Cana-
dian jurisdiction to enact comprehensive legislation to protect consumers
against unfair and deceptive business practices. The B.C. Trade Practices
Act I2 received first reading on May 8, 1974, and was proclaimed in force
July 5, 1974.13 In Ontario, the Business Practices Act' 4 was read for the first
7 Trebilcock et al., A Study on Consumer Misleading and Unfair Trade Practices(Ottawa, Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, Bureau of Competition
Policy, 1976) (hereinafter the Trebilcock Study). This two-volume study provides an
excellent analysis of various questions relating to the regulation of consumer fair trade
practices at the federal level. There is considerable reference to the Trebilcock Study
proposals, infra.
8 Cohen and Ziegel Study, supra, note 5.
9 Romero, Federal-Provincial Relations in the Field of Consumer Protection
(Ottawa: Consumer Research Council, 1975).
10 Furness, The Time is Now, Trial, Aug.-Sept., 1968 at 197. Ralph Nader has
also urged that consumers not confuse "verbal and symbolic momentums- such as
new, toothless laws with no funding and enforcement -with true progress." Fake
Reforms? Trial, Feb.-March 1970 at 55. Quoted in Eovaldi and Gestrin, Justice for
Consumers: The Mechanisms of Redress (1971), 66 Nw. U.L.R. 281, n.3.
11Leff, Unconscionability and the Code- The Emperor's New Clause (1967),
115 U.Pa. L.R. 485 at 559.
12 S.B.C. 1974, c. 96, as amended by S.B.C. 1975 c. 80. Hereinafter the B.C. Act.
13 With the exception of ss. 2(3) (n) and 2(3) (p). At time of writing these sections
have not been proclaimed in force. See, infra, note 157 and accompanying text.
14S.O. 1974, c. 131. Hereinafter the Ontario Act.
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time on May 9, 1974; however, the Ontario Act was not proclaimed in force
until May 1, 1975. The third province to enact a trade practices statute was
Alberta, where the Unfair Trade Practices Act' became effective on January
1, 1976. The fourth and final provincial statute that is relevant to this study
is the Saskatchewan Trade Practices Act.16 Although the Saskatchewan Act
is still in bill form at the date of writing, its passage is expected in the spring
of 1978.17
The four provincial trade practices statutes, which provide the basis for
this article, are not mere duplicates. Even a superficial reading of these enact-
ments will reveal significant differences in the scope of the legislation, the
range of prohibited practices, the choice and availability of remedies, the
nature and extent of the administrative powers of the enforcing authority, and
the availability and utilization of the criminal sanction. Parts B and C of this
article are devoted to an exploration and an evaluation of these differences.
There are, nonetheless, certain fundamental similarities both in concept and
content.
The conceptual similarity is indicated by the statutory titles. Each of the
enactments is intended as a comprehensive measure designed, on the one
hand, to protect consumers from certain specified marketplace abuses and,
on the other hand, to provide effective procedures for the recovery of con-
sumer losses. The legislative strategy has been to create an integrated frame-
work of governmental enforcement mechanisms, consumer-initiated redress
procedures and, as a last resort, recourse to the criminal sanction.
Although the content of the provincial trade practices legislation is far
from uniform, the various statutory provisions reflect a general commitment to
the idea that a substantial reform of the common law was a critical prerequi-
site for even a minimally effective trade practices enactment. Consequently,
each of the statutes has substantially altered common law notions regarding
the scope of the contract, the doctrine of privity, the admissibility of parol
evidence, and the availability of remedies.' 8 There is also reflected in the
provincial legislation a structural uniformity that suggests some common start-
ing point. It seems clear that this starting point was the conscious adoption
of a legislative model already implemented in another jurisdiction. The pro-
vincial trade practices enactments, in my view, reflect a significant American
influence. Before commencing a comparative analysis of the provincial legis-
lation, it may be worthwhile to explore the extent of this influence and its
implications for the provincial draftsman.
15 S.A. 1975, c. 33, as amended by S.A. 197, c. 54. Hereinafter the Alberta Act.
30 The Saskatchewan Trade Practices Act, 1977 was still in bill form at time of
writing. See Proposal for a Bill on Trade Practices 1976 (Saskatchewan Department of
Consumer Affairs). For the sake of convenience this bill will hereinafter be cited as
the Saskatchewan Act.
17 Conversation with the Saskatchewan Deputy Minister of Consumer Affairs,
March 22, 1977.
18 Discussed, infra, in Part B.
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3. The American Influence
The American experience in the regulation of unfair and deceptive trade
practices is an extensive one, both at the federal and state levels. 19 At the
national level, the Federal Trade Commission has become "a formidable
consumer protection agency."2 0 Armed with a wide range of administrative
and rule-making powers,-2 the FTC has assumed the predominant jurisdiction
over nationally significant marketplace abuses.2 2 It has also played an impor-
tant role in the development of state trade practices legislation. To date,
forty-eight states have enacted legislation to deal with unfair and deceptive
trade practices.2 3 There is considerable variance among the legislation both
as to structure and style, but four basic models are discernible: "little FTC
Acts," consumer fraud statutes, deceptive trade practices legislation, and the
Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Act.
The "little FTC Act" designation is somewhat of a misnomer. Although
the model was a consequence of the collaboration of the FTC with the
Committee on Suggested Legislation of the Council of State Governments,
10 There is also a considerable involvement in trade practices regulation at the
local or municipal levels, the best example being New York City. See generally
Lefkowitz, Some Reflections on Consumer Protection in New York (1975), 10 Gonzaga
L.R. 381; Note, New York City's Alternative to the Consumer Class Action: The
Government as Robin Hood (1971-72), 9 Harv. J. Legis. 301; Comment, Deceptive
Practices in the Marketplace: Consumer Protection by New York Government Agencies
(1974-75), 3 Fordham Urban L.. 491.
20 Kintner and Smith, The Emergence of the Federal Trade Commission as a
Formidable Consumer Protection Agency (1975), 26 Mercer L.R. 651 at 688. But cf.
Posner, Do We Really Need an FTC (1969), 3 Antitrust L. & Econ. R. 65.
21In January, 1975, Congress passed the Magnusson-Moss Warranty -Federal
Trade Commission Improvement Act, expanding FTC powers in areas of investigation,
rule-making and civil penalties for knowing violations. See generally Trebilcock Study,
supra, note 7 at 116 and 113.
22 The literature on the FTC is enormous. Four very helpful recent articles are
Kintner and Smith, supra, note 20; Erxleban, The FTCs Kaleidoscopic Unfairness
Statute: Section 5 (1975), 10 Gonzaga L.R. 333; Kaplan, The Federal Trade Commis-
sion and Equitable Remedies (1975), 25 Am. U.L.R. 173; Nelson, The Politicization
of FTC Rulemaking (1976), 8 Conn. L.R. 413.
2 Note, Non-Traditional Remedies for the Settlement of Consumer Disputes
(1976), 49 Temple L.Q. 385 at 408, n. 148. Also see Trebilcock Study, supra, note 7
at 115. The two states lacking such laws are Alabama and Tennessee. Both, how-
ever, have established consumer complaint clearing-houses to receive complaints, pro-
vide advice, represent consumer interests before state bodies, and recommend legislation.
See Sebert, Enforcement of State Deceptive Trade Practices Statutes (1975), 42 Tn.
L.R. 689 at 703, and Harrison, Consumer Protection in Alabama - Its Status and
a Proposal (1975), 5 Cumb.-Sam. L.R. 404. For a general history of state unfair
trade practices legislation see Lovett, State Deceptive Trade Practice Legislation (1972),
46 Tul. L.R. 724. Other helpful analyses are found in Kazanjian, Consumer Protection
by the State Attorneys General: A Time for Renewal (1973), 49 Notre Dame Law.
410; Reed, Legislating for the Consumer: An Insider's Analysis of the Consumers
Legal Remedies Act (1971), 2 Pac. L.J. 1; Jeffries, Protection for Consumers Against
Unfair and Deceptive Business (1974), 57 Marquette L.R. 559; Note, An Act to
Prohibit Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices (1970), 7 Harv. J. Legis. 122; Tennyson,
The Deceptive and Unfair Trade Practices Act: A New Approach to Trade Regulation
in Florida (1974), 2 Fla. State U.L.R. 223; Symposium, The Developing Law of
Consumer Protection (1975), 10 Gonzaga L.R. 319 et seq.
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and to this extent carried the FTC's encouragement for state adoption, the
"little FTC Act" is considerably broader and more effective in its remedial
provisions than the federal act, providing private enforcement remedies as
well as administrative measures. The formal title of the model bill is the
Uniform Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Act (UTPCPA), 2 4 but
most American commentators prefer the more colloquial designation. "Little
FTC Acts" have been passed by at least fifteen states.25 They are particularly
attractive for those jurisdictions which require both anti-trust and consumer
trade practices protection. To accommodate state preferences, the UTPCPA
provided three alternative formulations of the prohibited conduct provision.20
Consumer fraud laws are the primary vehicle for state enforcement in at
least thirteen states.27 Providing protection against deceptive or unconscion-
able commercial practices, these statutes are substantially similar to the "little
FTC Acts" with one important exception. The "little FTC" model encom-
passes all unfair methods of competition whereas the consumer fraud statutes
focus only upon consumer transactions.
The third legislative model utilized in state trade practices regulation is
a variation of the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act (UDTPA) that was
promulgated in 1966 by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uni-
form State Laws. 28 In lieu of the broad definitions of deceptive practices found
in the first two models, the UDTPA lists twelve specific prohibitions relating
to problems of trade names, quality misrepresentation, and "bait and switch"
selling.&29 Some states have added a thirteenth provision prohibiting "any other
act or practice which is unfair or deceptive to the consumer."'80 The UDTPA
2 4 Originally published by the Council of State Governments' Committee on
Suggested State Legislation in 1967 and amended in 1969 and 1970. See, Suggested
State Legislation, Vol. 29 (Chicago: Council of State Governments, 1970) at 141, and
Haemmel, George and Bliss, eds., Consumer Law (St. Paul, Minn.: West, 1975) at 111.
25 Sebert, supra, note 23 at 699. The most recent survey of the "little FTC" legis-
lation is found in Schulman, Little FTC Act: The Neglected Alternative (1976), 9
John Marshall J. of P.P, 351. Schulman concludes at 375 that the little FTC Act is an
act which is "necessary to the administration of justice in the field of consumerism."
2 0 Alternative Form No. 1 utilizes the broad language of s. 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission Act (15 U.S.C., s. 45 et seq.) and prohibits "Unfair methods of competition
and unfair or deceptive trade practices."
Alternative Form No. 2, which made "false, misleading or deceptive acts or
practices in the conduct of any trade or commerce" unlawful, was intended for those
states that can deal with anti-competitive practices under other legislation.
Alternative Form No. 3 itemizes twelve prohibited practices and provides a catch-
all clause to reach other non-specified forms of deception.
See generally Haemmel, George and Bliss, supra, note 24 at 112 and the Trebilcock
Study, supra, note 7 at 115-119.
2 7 Sebert, supra, note 23 at 699; Note, supra, note 23 at 409.
2 8 Note, supra, note 23 at 409. The UDTPA is evaluated in Dole, Merchant and
Consumer Protection: The Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act (1967), 76 Yale LJ.
485. Also see Dole, Consumer Class Actions under the Uniform Deceptive Trade
Practices Act, [19681 Duke LJ. 1101.
29 Note, supra, note 23 at 409, n. 159.
3o Id. at 410.
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is deficient insofar as it provides only for private remedies and contains no
provision for public enforcement. Some states have amended their version
of the Act to include an administrative enforcement procedure and at least
one state with a UDTPA history has opted for the "little FTC" model.31
To date, fourteen states retain the deceptive trade practices statute as their
primary legislative vehicle for the regulation of marketplace abuse. 2
The fourth and final model, the Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Act
(UCSPA),33 was approved by the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws in
1970 and by the American Bar Association in 1972. Although similar in form
to the "little FTC Act,"34 the UCSPA differs from the other models in two
significant respects. First, its coverage is limited to "consumer transactions"35
whereas two of the other models, the "little FTC Act" and the UDTPA,
extend to all commercial transactions. Secondly, although the UCSPA adopts
the style of the UDTPA in listing specifically certain proscribed practices,36
it goes beyond the UDTPA in providing a general prohibition of both decep-
tive and unconscionable acts or practices.3 7 The UCSPA or a variation of it
has been adopted in four states: Kansas, Ohio, Utah, and Nebraska. s
Which of the four legislative models has had the greatest impact in the
drafting of the Canadian trade practices enactments? Because of the substan-
tial overlap in style and structure among the American models, any attempt
to select one would prove impracticable. Indeed, the difficulty is compounded
by the fact that there is a wide divergence in several respects among the
provincial enactments.3 9 However, two pronouncedly American influences are
evident in each of the provincial trade practices statutes. The first is the
provincial draftsman's decision to combine a general, open-textured prohibi-
tion of unfair or deceptive trade practices with a non-exhaustive "shopping
list" of specifically proscribed practices.40 The second is the uniform structural
preference accorded to the administrative and civil remedies, and the conse-
quent relegation of the criminal sanction to a supplementary position of last
resort.41 Both features are particularly evident in the Uniform Consumer Sales
31 ld. at 409-410; Sebert, supra, note 23 at 700.
3 2 Sebert, supra, note 23 at 700.
33 7 Uniform Laws Ann. 212 (master ed. Supp. 1975). For a panel discussion on
the UCSPA see (1971-72), 27 Bus. Law. 139. One commentator has suggested that the
UCSPA has become nothing more than a "model act for the preservation of the status
quo": see Rice, Uniform Consumer Sales Practice Act-Damages Remedy: The
NCCUSL Giveth and Taketh Away (1972), 67 Nw. U.L.R. 369 at 384.
34 Supra, notes 24 to 26 and accompanying text.
3( UCSPA, supra, note 33, ss. 2-4.
386 Sebert, supra, note 23, at 702; Haemmel, George and Bliss, supra, note 24 at 112.
37 ld. Also see Trebilcock Study, supra, note 7 at 116.
38 Sebert, supra, note 23 at 702, n. 62; Haemmel, George and Bliss, supra, note 24
at 112.
39 See the analysis, infra, Part B.
40 B.C. Act, ss. 2-3; Ontario Act, ss. 2-3; Alberta Act, s. 4; Saskatchewan Act, ss. 3-4.
And see, infra, Part B.
4 1 See, infra, Part B and the discussion of the criminal sanction.
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Practices Act and thus persuade me that the UCSPA was in many respects
the most influential American model. Regrettably, some of the more progres-
sive aspects of this Uniform Act were conscientiously ignored in the drafting
of the Canadian legislation. The nature and extent of the deviation from the
American model provides a highly relevant backdrop to the analysis and
evaluation of the provincial statutes.
B. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE PROVINCIAL
LEGISLATION
1. Application and Scope
The ostensible concern of each of the provincial enactments is the pro-
tection of the consumer against deceptive, unconscionable, and generally
unfair sales practices. To this end, the provincial legislatures have provided
what is, in their view, the appropriate mix of private and public enforcement
and reparative mechanisms that will best achieve this primary objective. Given
the inevitability of provincial idiosyncracies regarding questions of adminis-
trative or institutional structure, it is not surprising that there is a wide
divergence in the legislation with respect to the range of remedies and the
strategies of enforcement. What is surprising, however, is the extent of vari-
ance with respect to questions of legislative ambit and application. Even
though the four trade practices statutes were drafted within three years of
each other and were readily available to successive draftsmen, the definitional
differences are striking. These are most evident in the following areas: (a) the
focal point of the legislation; (b) the scope of scrutiny; (c) the identity of
the parties; (d) the types of goods and services; and (e) the necessity for
actual agreement. Each of these will be considered in turn.
(a) The Definitional Focus
Every consumer sales practices statute, indeed any regulatory statute,
requires a reasonably precise definitional focus. To the extent that the provin-
cial trade practice statutes are concerned with deceptive and unconscionable
consumer sales practices, one would think that the most appropriate defini-
tional focus would be any "consumer transaction"; that is, any disposition
of goods or services, whether by sale, lease, lottery or otherwise, wherein
the goods or services are to be used for purposes that are primarily personal,
family, or household. Where certain commodities, whether tangible or in-
tangible, are already subject to legislative regulation - for example, land
transactions, securities and insurance - appropriate exclusions could be
made.42
The B.C. Act speaks of the "consumer transaction" as the focal point
for the regulation of deceptive and unconscionable trade practices. 43 How-
2All of the provincial trade practices enactments have expressly excluded securi-
ties; all but the B.C. Act have also excluded all money-lending transactions; the B.C.
and Saskatchewan Acts have excluded contracts of insurance as well. See B.C. Act,
s. 1(1); Ontario Act, s. l(f); Alberta Act, s. l(f) and Saskatchewan Act, s. 2.
4 3 B.C. Act, ss. 2(1) and 1(c).
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ever, unlike the legislation in Alberta or Saskatchewan which limits the defini-
tion of "consumer transaction" to the disposition of personal property or
provision of services to an individual for purposes that are primarily personal,
family, or household,44 the B.C. definition is significantly wider, extending to
consumer "business opportunities" and supplier advertising as well.45
The Ontario approach is less precise. While certain specified unfair sales
practices are proscribed, the focal point of the legislation is the "consumer
representation" itself which has been defined as follows:
"consumer representation" means a representation, statement, offer, request or
proposal,
(i) made respecting or with a view to the supplying of goods or services,
or both, to a consumer, or
(ii) made for the purpose of or with a view to receiving consideration for
goods or services, or both, supplied or purporting to have been supplied to
a consumer;46
The difficulty with this approach is twofold. The first is the "bafflingly opaque
language" 47 employed in the definition of consumer representation. A second
and related difficulty is one of definitional structure. In order to discover the
intended ambit of the Ontario Act, the concerned consumer or supplier must
plod through no less than four definitional sections48 clouded by arcane legal
terminology.49 The approach taken by B.C., Alberta, and Saskatchewan with
their focus on "consumer transaction" provides a more comprehensible
definitional direction.
(b) The Scope of Scrutiny
The question of legislative scope, at least in relation to modern consumer
trade practices legislation, is more properly a question of legislative response
to common law absurdities. Every student of commercial law is painfully
familiar with the artificiality and the anomalies that have plagued the
44 Alberta Act, s. 1(c); Saskatchewan Act, s. 2.
45 B.C. Act, s. 1(1) defines "consumer transaction" as follows:
(i) a sale, lease, rental, assignment, award by chance, or other disposition or
supply of any kind of personal property to an individual for purposes that are
primarily personal, family, or household, or that relate to a business opportunity
requiring both expenditure of money or property and personal services by that
individual and in which he has not been previously engaged, or
(ii) a solicitation or promotion by a supplier with respect to a transaction
referred to in subparagraph (i);
Note the influence of the Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Act. See UCSPA,
supra, note 33, s. 2(1).
46 Ontario Act, s. 1 (c).
47 Ziegel, supra, note 3 at 12.
48 Ontario Act, ss. 1 (b) (c) (f) and (i) for the definition of "consumer, .... consumer
representation," "goods," and "services."
49For example, see Ontario Act, s. l(g). The draftsman's use of "chattels
personal" and other arcane legal concepts was vigorously criticized in the Ontario
Legislature during the debate on the Ontario Act. Mr. James Renwick M.P.P. suggested
that the House was "involved in a kind of marshmallow world of traditional legal
conceptions that aren't going to help the consumer at all." Ont. Leg. Debates
(November 28, 1974) at 5849. Also see, infra, note 354 and accompanying text.
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Anglo-Canadian judiciary as a consequence of its general reluctance to extend
the scope of the contract to include all of those statements and representa-
tions that are properly a part of the bargain.re The distinctions between a "mere
representation" and a contractual term, or between a warranty and a condi-
tion, have no place in a modem consumer trade practices statute.r ' Whatever
civil or administrative remedies are statutorily provided, they should be avail-
able whenever a deceptive or unconscionable sales practice has resulted in
consumer dissatisfaction. 2 It is submitted that the operative concept in a
consumer sales context must be detrimental reliance. 53 Whether the seller or
supplier intended his representation to carry a contractual consequence is
irrelevant. The loss suffered by the consumer is the same.54 The statutory
language ought to acknowledge this reality.
It is submitted, therefore, that the scope of any meaningful consumer
trade practices enactment must include any representation or conduct that is
deceptive, misleading, or unconscionable without regard to outmoded com-
mon law categorizations. Nor should scrutiny be restricted to those acts or
practices that occurred before or during the consumer transaction. To ade-
quately regulate post-contractual collection practices55 and to clarify the
inter-relationship of tort and contract remedies in a post-contractual misrep-
resentation situation,56 the legislative scope must also extend to any unfair prac-
tices that occur after the consumer transaction has been completed. Related
5OAn excellent analysis is provided in Allan, The Scope of the Contract (1967),
41 Austral. L.J 274. Professor Allan argues persuasively at 288 that "any statement
made in the course of negotiations which becomes part of the basis of the bargain in
the sense that its natural tendency would be to induce the other party to enter into the
contract should be a term of the contract." Also see the Uniform Commercial Code,
s. 2-313(1).
51 Trebilcock Study, supra, note 7 at 199-202. Every student of commercial law
quickly realizes that the method of classifying various representations or statements as
contractual or non-contractual largely depends on the kind of remedy that the court
feels is appropriate. Lord Denning candidly conceded this result-oriented process in a
comment in (1967), 41 Austral. L.J 293 at 293:
Whenever a judge thinks that damages ought to be given, he finds that there was
a collateral contract rather than an innocent misrepresentation. In practice when
I get a representation prior to a contract which is broken and the man ought to
pay damages, I treat it as a collateral contract. (Quoted in Trebilcock Study,
supra, note 7 at 202).
52 These remedies should be available in cases where the sales practice had the
"capability" or "tendency" of deceiving or misleading a consumer as well as in the
case where actual deception had occurred. See, infra, notes 59 to 75 and accompanying
text
53 Trebilcock Study, supra, note 7 at 207.
54Id.
55 See Comment to UCSPA, supra, note 33, s. 3 (a).
56 The waters have been muddied by . Nunes Diamond Ltd. v. Dominion Electric
Protection Co. (1972), 26 D.L.R. (3d) 699 (S.C.C.). The majority of the court was
of the view that intra-contractual misrepresentation was not actionable in tort "unless
the negligence relied on can properly be considered an independent tort unconnected
with the performance of the contract." (at 727-8) Cf. Esso Petroleum v. Mardon[1976] 2 W.L.R. 583 (C.A.) and see Ziegel, Tortious Liability for Pre-Contractual and
Intra-Contractual Misrepresentations (1976), 1 C.B.LJ. 259.
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to this question of scope is the important issue of non-disclosure. The com-
mon law, traditionally, did not impose upon the seller any affirmative duty
to disclose all the material facts. 57 In recent years, however, Canadian courts
have imposed liability where the non-disclosure was shown to be negligent. 58
The situation needs to be clarified. A consumer trade practices statute should
expressly include material non-disclosure within its ambit of actionable mis-
representations.
Finally, if the proper scope of scrutiny should be any conduct, including
non-disclosure, occurring before, during or after a consumer transaction, that
is deceptive, misleading or unconscionable, what should be the standard of
deceptiveness? 59 Should the court require proof of deception in fact or
merely a capacity to deceive? The latter test is clearly appropriate in cases
of preventative litigation involving actions for injunctive or declaratory re-
lief. 0 Whether this lower standard ought to apply in money-loss consumer
litigation is a more difficult question. One commentator has argued that the
adoption of the "capacity to deceive" standard of proof would at least provide
consumers with the necessary incentive to seek redress for losses suffered.61
However, this "easier proof" rationale is not nearly as persuasive as the
simple fact that the imposition of a "capacity to deceive" standard would not
seriously burden the marketing practices of most honest businessmen.62
The consumer trade practices enactments of British Columbia and Sas-
katchewan provide commendable coverage. In the B.C. Act, a deceptive act
or practice is defined as "any oral, written, visual, descriptive, or other
representation, including non-disclosure, or any conduct having the capability,
tendency or effect of deceiving or misleading a person."' ' The Act expressly
provides that liability will attach to any deceptive or unconscionable act or
practice whether it occurs "before, during or after the consumer transaction."64
The Saskatchewan Act gives similarly extensive coverage by defining unfair
acts or practices as including any representation or conduct, including failure
57 Trebilcock Study, supra, note 7 at 204.
58 See Fines Flowers v. General Accident Assurance Co. (1974), 49 D.L.R. (3d)
641; Walter Cabott Construction Ltd. v. The Queen, (1974), 44 D.L.R. (3d) 82;
Bango v. Holt (1972) 21 D.L.R. (3d) 66. These cases and others are discussed in
Trebilcock Study, supra, note 7 at 204-206.
59With respect to federal misleading advertising regulation, see Miniter, Mis-
leading Advertising: The Standard of Deceptiveness (1976), 1 C.B.LJ. 435.
60 It is surely justifiable to use the "capacity to deceive" test where the remedy is
a preventative one, i.e., an injunction. One should not have to wait for actual injury
or actual loss where the capacity for such is evident.
01 Shea, Toward Effective Consumer Law Enforcement: The Capacity to Deceive
Test Applied to Private Actions (1975), 10 Gonzaga L.R. 457 at 477.
62 Indeed most businessmen would probably be surprised that there is even a
controversy about the appropriate standard of deceptiveness in the area of consumer
trade practices. To require vendors to refrain from engaging in acts or practices that
are capable of deceiving reasonable consumers is not an undue imposition.
63 B.C. Act, s. 2(1). (Emphasis added)
G41d., ss. 2(2) and 3(1).
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to disclose,65 that has the "tendency, capability or effect"'66 of deceiving or
misleading an ordinary consumer. Coverage is also expressly extended to un-
fair or unconscionable acts or practices occurring before, during, or after a
consumer transaction. 67
The scope of scrutiny is less than adequate in the Alberta Act and
wholly inadequate in the Ontario Act. Both the Alberta and Ontario enact-
ments are concerned only with the unfair practices that occur prior to con-
tract.6s The Ontario Act is even more deficient in this respect since it only
provides protection against certain representations and not against deceptive
conduct generally.6 As to non-disclosure, the Ontario Act has specified "fail-
ing to state a material fact" as one of its itemized deceptive practices.70 The
specification approach is found in the Alberta Act which limits non-disclosure
protection to non-disclosure of a defect in the goods or of an inability to
provide all of the promised services. 71 The B.C. and Saskatchewan approach
which includes non-disclosure within the general concept of deceptive or un-
fair practices is to be preferred. Over-specification is unjustifiable where
general prohibition is plainly required.72
The standard of deceptiveness implemented by the Ontario and Alberta
enactments also merits discussion. The Ontario Act requires deception
in fact,73 whereas Alberta has adopted a compromise position defining
an unfair act or practice as, inter alia, any representation or conduct that
"has the effect or might reasonably have the effect of deceiving or mis-
leading a consumer." 74 One might speculate as to the probable success of a
legal argument which suggested that the B.C., Saskatchewan, and Alberta
standards are conceptually indistinguishable. Or, was the Alberta draftsman
65 Saskatchewan Act, s. 3(1). This Act imposes liability with respect to non-
disclosure of material facts or information "irrespective of whether or not the facts or
information were known to the supplier." See s. 3(1)(c).
66 Id.
67 Id., s. 3(2).
68Alberta Act, s. 4(1) and (2); Ontario Act, s. 4(1).
69 Ontario Act, s. 2;
70 Id., s. 2(a) (xiii).
71 Alberta Act, s. 4(l)(c). Protection against non-disclosure of defects or of an
inability to supply services is limited to cases where such defect or failure to provide
services "substantially impairs or is likely to impair substantially the benefit or benefits
reasonably anticipated by the consumer under that transaction." The caution of the
legislative draftsman is evident.
72 Consumer protection against non-disclosure of material facts is indisputably
justifiable. A general prohibition of such practices would appear sensible. What addi-
tional benefits are provided by overly specific provisions such as s. 4(1) (c) in the
Alberta Act, supra, note 71? If anything, the Alberta approach runs the risk of being
unnecessarily restrictive.
73 Ontario Act, s. 2(a).
74 Alberta Act, s. 4(l)(d).
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consciously attempting to avoid protecting the "ignorant, the unthinking and
the credulous"? 75
(c) The Identity of the Parties
In each of the four provincial enactments, "consumer" is defined as an
individual or natural person who participates in a consumer transaction,
76
or is the target of a consumer representation,77 wherein goods or services are
provided for purposes that are primarily personal, family, or household.
78
The B.C. and Alberta Acts extend the definition to include donees. 79 It is not
clear, however, whether this abolition of horizontal privity is all that signifi-
cant since, in both of these enactments, consumer-initiated damage remedies
require the litigant to be a party to the actual consumer transaction. s0
The more interesting question related to the definitional identity of the
parties is that of vertical privity. In an era where mass advertising and manu-
facturers' predominance have all but obliterated the traditional rationales for
the privity of contract doctrine, 8' it is essential that a trade practices statute
plainly state the intention to abolish this "old and out-moded technical rule
of law." s As well, the legislation should extend liability to the supplier's
assignee.83
The British Columbia, Alberta, and Saskatchewan enactments have re-
sponded admirably. Vertical privity has been abolished expressly in the B.C.
75This is the oft-quoted "credulous man test" first enumerated in Charles of the
Ritz Distributors Corp. v. FTC, 143 F. 2d 676 at 679 (2d Cir. 1944) and applied by
Sinclair J. in R. v. Imperial Tobacco Products Ltd. (1970), 16 D.L.R. (3d) 470 (Alta.
S.C.), aff'd 22 D.L.R. (3d) 51. The test is discussed by Miniter, supra, note 59, passim.
The Alberta Act's requirement of reasonability with respect to potential deception in
s. 4(1)(d) appears to be a conscious rejection of the "credulous man" test in unfair
trade practices regulation. Cf. Saskatchewan Act, s. 3(1) which provides protection
against any conduct having "the tendency, capability or effect of deceiving or misleading
an ordinary consumer"; and B.C. Act, s. 2(1) which scrutinizes any conduct having
"the capability, tendency or effect of deceiving or misleading a person." (Emphasis
added.)
76 B.C. Act, s. 1(1); Alberta Act, s. 1(a); Saskatchewan Act, s. 2.
77 Ontario Act, s. 1(b) and (c).
78B.C. Act, s. 1(1); Ontario Act, s. 1(b); Alberta Act, s. 1(f); Saskatchewan
Act, s. 2.
79 B.C. Act, s. 1(1) "consumer"; Alberta Act, s. 1(a) "consumer."
80B.C. Act, s. 20(1) and Alberta Act, s. 11(1). The availability of injunctive and
declaratory remedies and the necessity for actual agreement is discussed, infra, in sub-
part (e) of this Part. See notes 115-133 and accompanying text.
81 If the traditional justification for the doctrine of privity was the concern that
liabilities should not attach where no consideration has passed between the parties, this
rationale is "clearly without meaning in a consumer context where the consideration
moving to and from the manufacturer is obvious." Trebilcock Study, supra, note 7 at
236. Also see Report on Consumers Warranties and Guarantees in the Sale of Goods
(Ontario Law Reform Commission, 1972) at 65-77.
82 Randy Knitvear Inc. v. American Cyanamid, 181 N.E. 2d. 399 (N.Y.C.A.,
1962) per Field J. at 402.
83 The difficult question is the extent of the assignee's liability. See, in ra, notes
88-93 and accompanying text.
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and Saskatchewan legislation 4 and impliedly in the Alberta Act.80 The On-
tario Act, however, is somewhat obscure on this important issue. The "con-
sumer representation" focus is limited to representations, statements, offers,
requests, or proposals that are made "respecting, or with a view to the supply-
ing of goods or services, or both, to a consumer" or "for the purpose of or
with a view to receiving consideration for goods or services or both, supplied
.. . to a consumer." 88 Although it may be arguable that a manufacturer's
advertisements were made with a view to receiving consideration for products
or services ultimately "supplied" to a consumer, the actual marketing rela-
tionships that may exist in a distribution chain may well preclude such a
finding.87 Ontario would be well-advised to clarify the privity question, pref-
erably in unequivocal statutory language that would be comprehensible to
both consumers and the business community.
The legislative response to the question of assignment has been more
uniform. The B.C., Alberta, and Saskatchewan enactments have expressly
defined "supplier" to include any assignee of the supplier.8 8 This extension
of liability is consistent with earlier federal and provincial legislative re-
sponses89 to the problem of "cut-off clauses" 0 in consumer transactions.
What should be the extent of the assiguee's liability in a situation where there
has been a violation of a consumer trade practices statute? The argument can
be made that the assignee's position ought to be no better than that of the
supplier who had contravened a provision of the trade practices statute. If
one objective of consumer protection legislation is to provide effective redress
for all reasonably foreseeable losses, then any statutory provision limiting the
assigee's liability to the amount that has been paid to the assignee would
properly be subject to criticism. It may be economically irrational to bur-
den the assignee with unlimited liability respecting all consequential losses
flowing from the supplier's contravention, particularly where the trade prac-
tices provision that has been violated incorporates a degree of imprecision
84B.C. Act, s. 1(1) "supplier"; Saskatchewan Act, s. 15(1).
85 Alberta Act, s. 1 (h).
8 8 Ontario Act, s. 1 (c).
87 This point is made in the Trebilcock Study, supra, note 7 at 240.
8 8 B.C. Act, s. 1(1); Alberta Act, s. 1(h); Saskatchewan Act, s. 2.
89 See the Bills of Exchange Act, R.S.C. 1970, c. B-5 (as amended by R.S.C. 1970,
c. 4, 1st. Supp., s. 1), ss. 188-192. Most provincial legislatures have now enacted com-
plementary legislation to protect consumers against assignee "cut-off clauses." The
Ontario Consumer Protection Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 82 (as amended by S.O. 1971, c. 24),
s. 42a is a typical provision:
The assignee of any rights of a lender has no greater rights than and is subject
to the same obligations, liabilities and duties as the assigner and the provisions
of this Act apply equally to such assignee.
Other provincial legislation providing similar protection is listed in the Trebilcock
Study, supra, note 7 at 241, n. 166.
90 One commentator has argued that "cut-off" clauses are not all that offensive
and that legislative abolition of the holder-in-due-course rule in consumer credit trans-
actions "is likely to make the consumer worse off rather than better off by making
credit purchases more costly." See Posner, Reflections on Consumerism, 20 Law School
Record 19 at 22.
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through the use of such terms as "tendency to mislead" or "substantial bene-
fit."91 In the context of unfair sales practices law, it may be justifiable to impose
some limit to the assignee's liability. The only enactment that has done so is the
Ontario Act, which has limited the liability of the assignee to the "amount
paid to the assignee under the agreement.192 Although the extent of assignee
liability is an issue of some controversy, the better view appears to be that
the Ontario Act's limitation represents "a fair balancing of both parties in-
terests. 9o
a
(d) The Types of Goods and Services
The four provincial enactments have uniformly focused upon those con-
sumer transactions where goods or services are supplied to an individual for
purposes that are primarily personal, family, or household. 9 4 Goods have
generally been defined so as to exclude, inter alia, real property, choses in
action, and securities. 95 The B.C. and Saskatchewan legislation also exclude
contracts of insurance. 90 Where specialized legislation already exists with
respect to certain commodities, it is sensible to minimize legislative overlap.9 7
What is not understandable, however, is the decision of the Ontario, Alberta,
and Saskatchewan legislatures to exclude consumer transactions involving
"money."98 Only the B.C. Act has sought to apply the deceptive and uncon-
scionable trade practices protections to money-lending transactions. 9 This
scrutiny of the lender-credit field does not extend, however, to those situa-
tions where the credit is extended solely on the security of real property. 00
01 Both provisions, which appear in the provincial trade practices legislation are
highly open-textured. See B.C. Act, s. 2(1) and Ontario Act, s. 2(b)(iii).
9 2 Ontario Act, s. 4(4). This provision limits the assignee's liability to a restitu-
tionary recovery. Section 42a(2) of the Consumer Protection Act, supra, note 89,
permits a wider consumer recovery since the maximum recoverable is "the balance
owing on the contract at the time of the assignment" This latter provision has now
been superseded by Ontario Act, s. 4(4) which will apply with respect to any claim
under this Act.
98 Trebilcock Study, supra, note 7 at 242. The only other possibility with respect
to assignee liability in the context of a trade practices statute is to apply the "balance
owing" limitation discussed, supra, in note 92. Unfortunately, the preference for s. 4(4)
of the Ontario Act was neither explained nor debated in the Ontario Legislature.
94 Supra, notes 76 and 78 and accompanying text.
95 B.C. Act, s. 1(1) "personal property"; Alberta Act, s. 1(f); Ontario Act, s. l(j);
Saskatchewan Act, s. 2.
981d.
97 Supra, note 42 and accompanying text. Of course, where such exclusions are
made, the legislature should be sure that the more specialized regulatory structure that
already exists is effective. For example, "MIThe insurance industry should only be
exempted from a deceptive trade practice statute where the regulatory tradition and
practice of its insurance commissioners reflect a vigorous representation of consumer
interests." Lovett, supra, note 23 at 734.
98 Ontario Act, s. 1(j); Alberta Act, s. 1(j); Saskatchewan Act, s. 2.
99 B.C. Act, s. 1 (1), "personal property" definition.
200 Id.
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Given the limited protection provided by the federal Small Loans Act' 0' and
by provincial unconscionable transactions statutes, 10 2 it is submitted that
money-lending transactions should properly be the concern of any compre-
hensive trade practices enactment. The potential for deception and uncon-
scionability is no less significant in the lender-credit field than in the area of
vendor-credit. Yet only the latter transaction is indisputably subject to the
provisions of the provincial enactments. 03
Another equally critical deficiency in three of the enactments is the un-
realistically and unjustifiably restrictive definition of "services." Again, only
the B.C. Act has unequivocally included all services within its definition of
"consumer transaction.' 0 4 The other three enactments, however, have re-
stricted legislative protection to those services that (1) are provided in respect
of the maintenance or repair of goods or of an individual's private dwell-
ing,'0 5 (2) are provided for social, recreational, physical fitness or self-
improvement purposes, 0 6 and (3) are, in their nature, instructional or
educational.10 7 What about professional services? Should not the consumer
be protected against unfair practices by members of a profession? What
possible justification can there be for such wholesale exclusion of the sales
practices of doctors, lawyers, or real estate agents,10 8 to list the more obvious
service professionals? When the question was debated in the Ontario Legisla-
ture and a member of the Opposition attempted to persuade the government
to amend the definition so that "services of every nature and kind"'' 0 would
be included, the refusal to do so was explained by the suggestion that unfair
'
0
'R.S.C. 1970, c. S-11. The "impotence" of the federal Small Loans Act is
discussed in Trebilcock, The Pathology of Credit Breakdown (1976), 22 McGill L.
415 at 450.
'
0 2 All ten provinces have unconscionable transactions relief legislation or some
form thereof: see S.B.C. 1967, c. 14, ss. 17-20; R.S.A. 1970, c. 377; S.S. 1967, c. 86;
R.S.M. 1970, c. U-20; R.S.O. 1970, c. 472; S.Q. 1971, c. 74, s. 118; R.S.N.B. 1973,
c. U-I; R.S.N.S. 1967, c. 319; S.P.E.I. 1964, c. 35; and R.S.N. 1970, c. 382. And see
Romero, supra, note 9 at 1, n. 2.
10 3 Any representation by the vendor with respect to the credit terms arising out
of the sale of certain goods or services would be representations in relation to the
"consumer transaction" and thus would be governed by the trade practices legislation.
See, supra, notes 43 to 49 and accompanying text.
104B.C. Act, s. 1(1).
105 Alberta Act, s. 1(g) (i); Ontario Act, s. 1(i) (i); Saskatchewan Act, s. 2,
"services" definition.
'
0o Alberta Act, s. 1(g) (ii); Ontario Act, s. 1(i) (ii); Saskatchewan Act, s. 2.
107 Alberta Act, s. 1(g) (iv); Ontario Act, s. 1(i) (iii); Saskatchewan Act, s. 2.
108 Because the Ontario Act in s. l(i)(k) provides that "services means services
provided in respect of goods or of real property" (emphasis added) there is a possi-
bility that Ontario real estate agents would be subject to the provisions of the Act.
During the legislative debate on this point Mr. Frank Drea M.P.P. and Parliamentary
Assistant to the Minister of Consumer and Commercial Relations took the position
that the reference to "real property" in this definition "has no connection whatsoever
with the sale or transfer of real estate. Its only connection concerns renovations, repairs,
fixtures and so forth." Ont. Leg. Debates (February 6, 1975) at 7347. It will be
interesting to see how the courts will interpret this reference to "real property."
1o9 A motion to this effect was made by Mr. James Renwick M.P.P. See Ont. Leg.
Deb. (February 6, 1975) at 7342.
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trade practices were already covered by the various statutes that regulate the
professions."10 This is simply not true. While statutes regulating the profes-
sions do provide some protection against professional misconduct,"' there
are no comprehensive enforcement and reparation mechanisms such as the
public and private redress provisions found in the trade practices legisla-
tion.112 Effective lobbying by vested interest groups is the more credible
explanation for the restricted definition of "services." 113 The unfortunate
consequence of the Ontario, Alberta, and Saskatchewan restrictions was best
described by a member of the Ontario legislature who suggested that the
legislation might just as well have said "[n]o person shall engage in an unfair
practice unless he is a member of a profession. 1" 4
(e) The Necessity for Actual Agreement
Can action be taken with respect to deceptive or unconscionable sales
practices in a situation where no consumer contract was concluded? Or, is
actual agreement a necessary prerequisite for utilization of the remedies pro-
vided in the provincial enactments? Certainly the governmental enforcing
authority should have the statutory capacity to respond to marketplace pre-
varication without regard to the existence or non-existence of actual consumer
transactions. The preventive aspects of effective consumer trade practices
regulation would require and justify government-initiated action whenever a
supplier was engaging in, or about to engage in, an unfair sales practice as
defined by the legislation. On this point, the four provincial enactments are
more or less uniform. The governmental enforcing authority" 5 may obtain
an injunction, or declaration," x6 or issue a cease and desist order," 7 whenever
a supplier is engaging, or "is about to engage" '"8 in an unfair sales practice.
The completion of actual consumer transactions is properly irrelevant to the
availability of these administrative remedies."19
The necessity for actual agreement is a more difficult question in the
case of consumer-initiated remedies. Should a consumer's, right of action
"10 Mr. Frank Drea M.P.P. See Ont. Leg. Deb. (February 6, 1975) at 7346.
l' Law Society Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 238 (as amended by S.O. 1973, c. 49).
Sections 33-50 of the Act provide for disciplinary procedures in cases of alleged
professional misconduct and s. 51 establishes a Compensation Fund "in order to relieve
or mitigate loss sustained by any person in consequence of dishonesty" on the part of
any Ontario lawyer. (Emphasis added) Whether or not a payment will be made in any
particular case is a decision for Convocation which has been given "absolute discretion."
112 See Part B, infra, and the discussion of private and administrative remedies.
113 Ziegel, supra, note 3 at 12.
11 4 Mr. James Renwick M.P.P., Ont. Leg. Deb. (Feb. 6, 1975) at 7360.
315 More specifically the "Director of Trade Practices." See, infra, note 289 and
accompanying text.
116 B.C. Act, s. 16; Alberta Act, s. 12(2); Saskatchewan Act, s. 5 (only declaratory
relief).
117 Ontario Act, ss. 6-7; Saskatchewan Act, s. 14.
1 1 8 This extra protection to consumers is provided in two provinces: see B.C. Act,
s. 16 and Saskatchewan Act, s. 5 (with respect to declaratory relief only).
119 The availability of the criminal sanction is similarly unaffected by an absence
of actual agreement. See Part B, infra, and the discussion of the criminal sanction.
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depend upon the existence of a contract or transaction that was induced
by an unfair sales practice? Most of the losses that will arise as a consequence
of deceptive or unconscionable sales practices will involve the actual supply
of goods or services pursuant to de facto agreements. However, there may
well be situations where redress ought to be provided even though the ag-
grieved consumer did not actually conclude an agreement with the supplier,
one example being the case of a consumer who takes the time and trouble
to visit the supplier's premises, lured by the supplier's advertisement, only to
discover that the advertised representations as to quality, performance, price
advantage, or product availability were misleading. Is the consumer's reliance
loss any less because no actual agreement was concluded? The California
Consumers Legal Remedies Act'20 is one illustration of an attempt to provide
redress for reasonably foreseeable reliance losses without regard to actual
agreement.121 At the very least, provincial trade practices legislation should
permit consumer-initiated actions for injunctive or declaratory relief in any
case of an alleged statutory violation. This remedy should be available
whether or not the consumer-litigant actually entered into an agreement with
the alleged violator. Unfortunately, most of the provincial trade practice en-
actments have pre-conditioned the availability of consumer-initiated remedies
on a finding of actual agreement.
The most restrictive of the provincial provisions on this point is found
in the Ontario Act. Any consumer claim for damages must first establish that
the supplier's violation of the Act induced the litigant to enter into an actual
agreement1m And, with respect to injunctive or declaratory relief at the
behest of the consumer, the Ontario Act is silent.12 3
The Alberta and Saskatchewan provisions are, prima facie, more liberal.
Both enactments provide that an unfair act or practice may occur notwith-
standing that the consumer transaction was not completed. 24 Both statutes
also permit consumer-initiated injunctive or declaratory remedies. 125 The
difficulty is that here again a private action for injunction, declaration, or
damages is available only where the consumer has "entered into a consumer
transaction."'126 There is, however, an interesting and unique provision in the
Alberta Act which permits an action for injunctive or declaratory relief even
in the absence of actual transactions or agreements if the litigant is an in-
120 Cal. Stats. 1970, c. 1550; enacted as Cal. Civ. Code, ss. 1750 et seq.
121 An advertisement which prompted the consumer to act would be a "transaction"
within the meaning of the California Act. An actual contract is not a necessary condi-
tion precedent to consumer action. See Reed, supra, note 23 at 10.
122 Ontario Act, s. 4(1).
12 3 This omission in the Ontario Act is returned to in Part B, infra.
124 Alberta Act, s. 4(2); Saskatchewan Act, s. 3(2)(b).
125 Alberta Act, s. 11(2); Saskatchewan Act, s. 15(2) (f) (declaratory relief only).
126Alberta Act, s. 12(2); Saskatchewan Act, s. 15(1) and s. 2 definition of
"consumer transaction."
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corporated "consumer organization."'127 While this statutory recognition of
the value of consumer group litigation is commendable, s28 it is difficult to
understand why a similar right was denied to the individual or the unincor-
porated consumer group. If the concern of the Alberta legislature was that
the individual injunctive remedy would lead to a multiplicity of actions
against the high proffle violator, this concern could surely be alleviated by
an intervention of the governmental enforcing authority.229
The most liberal provisions with respect to the question of actual agree-
ment are found in the B.C. Act. Anyone, whether or not he has a special, or
indeed any interest, or is even affected by a consumer transaction, is permitted
to seek an injunction or a declaration with respect to a deceptive or uncon-
scionable act or practice engaged in by a supplier.130 It is arguable that
even actual agreement is not a prerequisite for a consumer-initiated damages
claim. The Act provides that damages are recoverable by a consumer where
he has "entered into a consumer transaction involving a deceptive or uncon-
scionable act or practice by a supplier.131 Consumer transaction, however, is
defined to include "a solicitation or promotion by a supplier."'132 Thus, some
non-contractual reliance losses may be recoverable by the consumer who
responds to the supplier's advertisement and thereby incurs some financial
loss only to discover that the representations were misleading or unfair and
in violation of the trade practices enactment. If this interpretation of the
statute is correct, 133 then the B.C. Act clearly emerges as the most liberal of
the provincial enactments with respect to questions of application and scope.
2. The Prohibited Practices
An important feature of any comprehensive consumer trade practices
enactment will be the statutory design of the prohibition provisions. The
legislative draftsman has essentially three choices. He may choose to provide
simply a general prohibition against all deceptive, misleading, or unconscion-
able conduct in consumer transactions. This is the approach taken in the
Federal Trade Commission Act' 34 which provides, inter alia, that "unfair or
deceptive acts or practices in commerce are declared unlawful."'135 While this
12 7 Alberta Act, s. 14. "Consumer organization" is defined in s. 1(b) as "any
corporation that has as one of its objects the protection or advancement of the
interests of consumers and is not incorporated for the purpose of acquiring gain for
its members."
128 Note the absence of any locus standi prerequisite.
120 This suggestion would simply be an extension of the existing substituted action
provision: see Alberta Act, s. 13. A notice requirement similar to s. 11(4) would be
an additional safeguard.
13 0 B.C. Act, s. 16(1).
181ld., s. 20(1).
1321d., s. 1(1).
183 The submission that would have to be accepted by a court is that the consumer's
action in responding to a "solicitation or promotion by a supplier" [s. 1(1) ] constitutes
an "entering into" of a consumer transaction within the meaning of ss. 20(1) and 1(1).
134 15 U.S.C., s. 45(a)(1) (1970).
'35 Id.
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blanket prohibition is definitionally capable of protecting the consumer
against all eventualities, its open-textured quality promotes needless uncer-
tainty and excessive litigation. 13 6 A trade practices enactment that is fair to
suppliers as well as consumers requires a greater degree of precision.
This concern for specificity may persuade the legislative draftsman to
adopt the U.K. Trade Description Acti37 approach, which provides an ex-
haustive listing of the specific practices that are proscribed by the legislation.
Unlike the general prohibition technique, the exhaustive specification method
cannot be criticized for lack of clarity. The problem here is one of inevitable
under-inclusion. The listing of prohibited practices will invariably fall short
of including every conceivable and innovative trade practice abuse.
It is impossible to frame definitions which embrace all unfair practices. There is
no limit to human inventiveness in this field. Even if all known unfair practices
were specifically defined and prohibited, it would be at once necessary to begin
all over again. If [a legislature] were to adopt this method of definition, it would
undertake an endless task. 3 8
The third approach available to the draftsman is one that combines a
general prohibition against unfair practices with a specific listing. This specific
itemization of prohibited acts or practices does not limit the generality of the
prohibition. This third approach seems to be the most appropriate for the
effective regulation of consumer trade practices. The non-exhaustive "shop-
ping list" coupled with a general prohibition provides an optimal combination
of specificity and flexibility.
This third alternative was adopted by each of the provinces that have
enacted consumer trade practice legislation. Noticeably influenced by the
Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Act,1' 9 each of the four provincial enact-
ments under consideration utilizes both the general prohibition and the
"shopping list" of unfair practices.
(a) The General Prohibition
The Ontario Act provides the clearest example of an open-textured gen-
eral prohibition: "[n]o person shall engage in an unfair practice."'1 40 Another
provision proceeds to itemize those practices that are deemed to be unfair
practices, one sub-part being devoted to "false, misleading or deceptive con-
sumer representations' 141 and the other to "unconscionable consumer repre-
sentations."' The inter-relationship of the general proscription and the
1
3 6 The FTC, however, has extensive rule-making powers which enable the agency
to inject some precision into the open-textured prohibitions. Rule-making is discussed
in Part C and D, infra. See notes 375 to 382 and 411 to 413 and accompanying text.
7 U.K. 1968, c. 29.
138 Federal Trade Commission v. The Sperry and Hutchinson Company, 405 U.S.
233, per White J. at 240, quoting from H.R. Rep. No. 1142. 63d. Cong. 2d Sess.,
18-19 (1914).
139 Supra, note 33.
140 Ontario Act, s. 3(1).
141 Id., s. 2(a).
4 2 Id., s. 2(b).
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"shopping list" of itemized prohibitions is somewhat more complex in the
B.C., Alberta, and Saskatchewan enactments. In the B.C. and Saskatchewan
legislation there exists a "double-barrelled" general prohibition, one provi-
sion providing an open-ended proscription of deceiving or misleading acts or
practices,143 and another provision providing similar generality with respect
to "unconscionable acts or practices."144 The only province that lacks an
open-ended prohibition of unconscionable acts or practices is Alberta. The
Alberta legislation does, however, prohibit any representation or conduct that
has the effect "or might reasonably have the effect" of deceiving or mislead-
ing any consumer.' 45
(b) The Deceptive Practices Shopping List
Why would a provincial legislative draftsman prefer to itemize illustra-
tions of the acts or practices that are deemed to be deceptive or misleading
under one heading and those that are suggested as unconscionable acts or
practices under another? An ordinary consumer would not really care how
the draftsman has characterized the unfair practice. His only concern would
be effective redress. Indeed, one might be hard pressed to articulate any
meaningful definitional distinction between the so-called "deceptive or mis-
leading acts or practices" and the "unconscionable" ones. Lawyers have
tended to explain this dichotomy by reference to the duality of law and
equity and the resulting division of responsibility for deception and un-
conscionability.146 While a single listing of the deemed prohibitions may be
more logical, the provincial enactments have retained the traditional distinc-
tion in drafting the "shopping lists."
Each of the provincial trade practices enactments has a fairly compre-
hensive listing of the deceptive or misleading acts or practices that are
deemed to be unfair practices: sixteen specifications in the B.C. Act, fourteen
in the Ontario Act, and twenty-one in the Alberta and Saskatchewan enact-
ments. While the scope of the prohibition and the standards of deceptiveness
may differ,147 there is a uniform proscription of at least these fourteen decep-
tive practices:
1. A representation that the subject of a consumer transaction has
sponsorship, approval, performance characteristics, accessories, ingredi-
ents, quantities, components, uses or benefits that it does not have;148
143B.C. Act, s. 2(1); Saskatchewan Act, s. 3(1).
144B.C. Act, s. 3(3); Saskatchewan Act, s. 4(1).
'45 Alberta Act, s. 4(1)(d).
146 There is a brief but worthwhile discussion of this point in the Trebilcock Study,
supra, note 7 at 196-197.
147 Supra, notes 50 to 75, and accompanying text.
I4sB.C. Act, s. 2(3)(a); Ontario Act, s. 2(a)(i); Alberta Act, s. 4(1) (d) (i);
Saskatchewan Act, s. 3(3) (a). Examples: "mileage per gallon" ads where such mileage
could only be attained under carefully controlled circumstances by a highly skilled
driver. And see UCSPA, s. 3(b)(1) and Comment.
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2. A representation that the supplier has a sponsorship, approval,
status, affiliation, or connection that he does not have; 49
3. A representation that the subject of a consumer transaction is of a
particular standard, quality, grade, style, or model if it is not;60
4. A representation that the subject of a consumer transaction has been
used to an extent that is different from the fact;' 5 '
5. A representation that the subject of a consumer transaction is new
or unused if it is not, or if it is deteriorated, altered, reconditioned, or
reclaimed;'5
6. A representation that the subject of a consumer transaction has a
particular prior history or usage if it has not;'"6
7. A representation that the subject of a consumer transaction is avail-
able for a reason that is different from the fact;' r"
8. A representation that the subject of a consumer transaction has been
made available in accordance with a previous representation if it has
not; 56
9. A representation that the subject of a consumer transaction is avail-
able if the supplier has no intention of supplying or otherwise disposing
of the subject as represented; 156
149B.C. Act, s. 2(3)(b); Ontario Act, s. 2(a)(iii); Alberta Act, s. 4(1)(d)(ii);
Saskatchewan Act, s. 3(3) (b). Example: "factory outlet" or "approved dealer" if such
a claim is untrue. And see UCSPA s. 3(b) (a) and Comment.
15oB.C. Act, s. 2(3)(c); Ontario Act, s. 2(a)(ii); Alberta Act, s. 4(1)(d)(iii);
Saskatchewan Act, s. 3(3)(c). Example: "Canada Grade A"; product model year
representations where such representations are untrue. And see UCSPA, s. 3(b)(2)
and Comment.
-15 B.C. Act, s. 2(3)(d); Ontario Act, s. 2(a)(iv); Alberta Act, s. 4(1)(d)(iv);
Saskatchewan Act, s. 3(3) (d). Example: the claim that a car is a "demonstrator -
almost new" where such is not in fact the case. And see UCSPA, s. 3(b) (3) and
Comment.
152B.C. Act, s. 2(3)(e); Ontario Act, s. 2(a)(v); Alberta Act, ss. 4(l)(d)(v) and
(vi); Saskatchewan Act, s. 3(3) (e). And see UCSPA, s. 3(b) (3) and Comment.
'3 B.C. Act, s. 2(3) (f); the point is not specifically included as a separate item-
ization in the Ontario Act but might fall within s. 2(a)(v); Alberta Act, s. 4(1)(d)
(vii); Saskatchewan Act, s. 3(3) (j). Example: a representation that the automobile
was "only driven on Sundays to church and back." There is no equivalent listing in
the UCSPA.
154B.C. Act, s. 2(3)(g); Ontario Act, s. 2(a)(vi); Alberta Act, s. 4(l)(d)(viii);
Saskatchewan Act, s. 3(3)(g). Example: 'Tire sales" or "lost our lease" sales if such
circumstances do not exist. And see UCSPA, s. 3 (b) (4) and Comment.
155B.C. Act, s. 2(3)(h); Ontario Act, s. 2(a)(vii); Alberta Act, s. 4(l)(d)(ix);
Saskatchewan Act, s. 3(3)(h). Example: claiming that an article is being sold at a
special reduction from the regular price where, in fact, the article is part of a special
shipment that was ordered strictly for the sale and has never been sold before and
particularly not at what is quoted as the "regular price." And see UCSPA, s. 3(b)(5)
and Comment.
'56B.C. Act, s. 2(3)(i); Ontario Act, s. 2(a)(viii); Alberta Act, ss. 4(l)(d)(x)
and (xv); Saskatchewan Act, s. 3(3)(i). Example: bait and switch selling. And see
UCSPA, s. 3(b)(6) and Comment.
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10. A representation that is such that a person could reasonably con-
clude that a price benefit or advantage exists, if it does not;157
11. A representation that a service, part, replacement, or repair is
needed if it is not; 58
12. A representation that the purpose or intent of any solicitation of,
or any communication with, a consumer by a supplier is for a purpose
or intent different from the fact; 59
13. A representation that a consumer transaction involves or does not
involve rights, remedies, or obligations if the representation is deceptive
or misleading;l 6°
14. A representation as to the authority of a salesman, representative,
employee, or agent to negotiate the final terms of a consumer transac-
tion if the representation is different from the fact."6
Each of the provincial shopping lists provides several important addi-
tions to these uniform proscriptions. B.C., Ontario, and Saskatchewan have
extended the statutory protection to the hitherto unregulated area of "com-
mercial puffery" by specifically prohibiting any representation using exaggera-
tion, innuendo, or ambiguity.16 The giving of an estimate or price quotation
which is materially less than the final price demanded by a supplier who has
proceeded with his performance of a consumer transaction without the con-
sumer's express consent also constitutes a deceptive practice under all but
the Ontario enactment.163 Finally, the use of advertising copy which gives
157B.C. Act, s. 2(3)(j). Example: any misrepresentation as to price reductions,
previous prices, or actual price paid. And see UCSPA, s. 3(b) (8) and Comment.
158 B.C. Act, s. 2(3)(k); Ontario Act, s. 2(a) (ix); Alberta Act, s. 4(1) (d) (xii);
Saskatchewan Act, s. 3(3) (k). Example: self-evident. See UCSPA, s. 3(b) (7) and
Comment. The problem of unnecessary repair is particularly evident in the television
repair industry. See "Half of TV Repairmen Overcharge in Star Test" (Toronto Star,
February 26, 1977, at A-1 and A-11).
159B.C. Act, s. 2(3)(1); Ontario Act, s. 2(a)(xiv); Alberta Act, s. 4(i)(xiii);
Saskatchewan Act, s. 3(3) (1). Example: such spurious sales pitches as "you have been
selected as the lucky winner of a free..." or "I am a student working my way through
college selling magazines. .. " There is no equivalent listing in the UCSPA but see
UCSPA, s. 3(b)(4): "that the subject of a consumer transaction is available to the
consumer for a reason that does not exist." The provincial legislation has a separate
listing for this type of practice: supra, note 154.
160 B.C. Act, s. 2(3)(m); Ontario Act, s. 2(a)(xi); Alberta Act, s. 4(l)(d)(xiv);
Saskatchewan Act, s. 3(3) (m). Example: the sales pitch that concludes: "just sign on
the dotted line ... no obligation ... you can get out of the contract anytime you want."
If the seller's intention is otherwise there has been a breach of this provision. See
UCSPA, s. 3(b)(10) and Comment The potential ambit of this type of provision is
discussed in Zysblat, Amendments to the British Columbia Trade Practices Act; The
Refinement of Omnibus Legislation (1976), 1 C.B.L.J. 99 at 102.
161 B.C. Act, s. 2(3)(o); Ontario Act, s. 2(a)(xi); Alberta Act, s. 4(i)(d)(xvi);
Saskatchewan Act, s. 3(3) (o). Example: a salesman represents that he has the "final
say" and is able to bind the supplier, when, in fact, he does not have such authority
and the supplier later disavows any knowledge of or responsibility for the salesman's
representations. There is no equivalent provision in the UCSPA.
162B.C. Act, s. 2(3) (r); Ontario Act, s. 2(a) (xiii); Saskatchewan Act, s. 3(3) (u).
163Alberta Act, s. 4(1) (d) (xvii); Saskatchewan Act, s. 3(3) (p); the B.C. Act,
provision, s. 2(3)(p), has not yet been proclaimed in force.
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less prominence to the full price of a consumer transaction than to the price
of any unit thereof has been specifically prohibited in the B.C., Alberta, and
Saskatchewan enactments.les
With the exception of two additional inclusions in the Saskatchewan Act
dealing with referral selling 65 and the use of the word "free, s166 the B.C. and
the Saskatchewan "shopping lists" of proscribed deceptive practices are com-
parable and commendable. Both the Ontario and the Alberta listings are
deficient in failing to include, in the former case, a specific prohibition of
low-balling 67 and unit price prominence,16 and in the latter case, a specific
extension of actionability to commercial puffery.169
(c) The Unconscionable Practices Shopping List
Although each of the provincial enactments has a separate specification
of acts or practices that traditionally can be characterized as relating to un-
conscionable as opposed to deceptive conduct, there is significant divergence
both in form and in substance. The most unusual and indeed most disap-
pointing structural feature is found in the Alberta enactment. With respect to
unconscionable conduct, the Alberta Act does not provide a general prohibi-
tion. Protection against gross over-reaching is limited to two specified prac-
tices: subjecting the consumer to undue pressure'170 and entering into a
consumer transaction where the supplier took unfair advantage of a con-
sumer's inability to understand the character or nature of the transaction. 17'
Why did Alberta choose this restrictive approach to the question of uncon-
scionability? Certainly this minimal specification does not detract or derogate
from any remedies with respect to unconscionable conduct that would be
available to the consumer at common law.'72 However, the disadvantage in
so limiting the specified proscriptions is evident. The range of civil and ad-
ministrative remedies provided by the trade practices enactmentra to both
36 B.C. Act, s. 2(3)(q); Alberta Act, ss. 4(1)(d) (xviii)-(xxi); Saskatchewan Act,
ss. 3(3)(q)(r). Example: "only $2.00 per visit" when the overall payment obligation
may run to several hundred dollars. This requirement that the total price for the goods
or services must be displayed as prominently as any unit price is one of the more
important protections in the provincial legislation. There is no equivalent provision in
the UCSPA.
165 Saskatchewan Act, s. 3(3) (s).
166M., s. 3(3) (t).
167 Cf., supra, note 163 and accompanying text.
168 Cf., supra, note 164 and accompanying text.
169 Cf., supra, note 162 and accompanying text.
17 0 Alberta Act, s. 4(1) (a).
171 Alberta Act, s. 4(1) (b). Section 4(1) (c) provides specific protection against
non-disclosure relating to a defect in the goods or to the availability of services. This
provision has been discussed, supra, note 71 and accompanying text.
172 Alberta Act, s. 20(2).
173 The range of private and administrative remedies is discussed, infra, in sub-
parts 3 and 4.
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consumers and consumer organizations, as well as to the enforcing authority,
may not be available at common law.174
This deficiency, fortunately, is not found in the B.C., Ontario, and Sas-
katchewan legislation. In each of these enactments there is a general prohibi-
tion of unconscionable practices175 followed by a non-exhaustive shopping
list of certain circumstances that may be relevant to a finding of unconscion-
ability.'7 6 The shopping lists contain the following uniform categories:
(1) that the consumer was subjected to undue pressure to enter into
the consumer transaction; 7 7
(2) that the consumer was taken advantage of by his inability or in-
capacity to reasonably protect his own interest by reason of his physical
or mental infirmity, ignorance, illiteracy, age, or his inability to under-
stand the character, nature, or language of the consumer transaction, or
any other matter related thereto;17
(3) that, at the time the consumer transaction was entered into, the
price grossly exceeded the price at which similar subjects of similar con-
sumer transactions were readily obtainable by like consumers;179
(4) that, at the time the consumer transaction was entered into, there
was no reasonable probability of full payment of the price by the con-
sumer;1
80
174 For example: An action by a "consumer organization" (s. 14) or a substituted
action by the Director (s. 12) are available by virtue of the statute and only with
respect to an unfair act or practice that has been defined as such by the Alberta Act.
Neither of the actions would be otherwise available at common law.
175B.C. Act, s. 4(3); Ontario Act, ss. 3(1) and 2(b); Saskatchewan Act, ss. 4(1)
and (2).
170The unconscionability "shopping list" contains certain specified circumstances
that may be relevant to a finding of unconscionability if the supplier "knew or ought
to have known" about the specified circumstances. In the B.C. and Saskatchewan Acts
the court must consider all surrounding circumstances including those specifically listed.
B.C. Act, s. 3(2); Saskatchewan Act, s. 4(2). The Ontario Act, however, provides that
the court "mnay" take into account the specified listing: Ontario Act, s. 2(b). The
mandatory language in the B.C. and Saskatchewan legislation seems more appropriate
as a legislative emphasis that the shopping list is a deliberate listing of marketplace abuses
and should always be relevant to any judicial determination of unconscionability under
a trade practices statute.
177B.C. Act, s. 3(2)(a); Ontario Act, s. 2(b) (viii); Saskatchewan Act, s. 4(2)(e)
("trickery or undue pressure"). Example: high pressure sales tactics.
178B.C. Act, s. 3(2)(b); Ontario Act, s. 2(b)(i); Saskatchewan Act, s. 4(2)(f).
Example: sales schemes that prey on elderly people or new immigrants who speak very
little English. See UCSPA, s. 4(c) (1) and Comment.
179 B.C. Act, s. 3(2) (c); Ontario Act, s. 2(b)(ii); Saskatchewan Act, s. 4(2)(c).
Example: such conduct as a home solicitation sale of cookware for $375 where a set
of comparable quality is readily available to the consumer for $125 or less. See
UCSPA, s. 4(c)(3) and Comment.
180B.C. Act, s. 3(2)(d); Ontario Act, s. 2(b)(iv); Saskatchewan Act, s. 4(2)(a).
Example: the sale of goods or services to a low-income consumer whom the salesman
knows or ought to know does not have sufficient income to meet all the payments. See
UCSPA, s. 4(c) (4) and Comment.
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(5) that the terms or conditions on, or subject to, which the consumer
transaction was entered into by the consumer are so harsh or adverse
to the consumer as to be inequitable.181
In addition to the circumstances noted above, the Ontario enactment
specifically includes any unconscionable consumer representation wherein the
person making the representation knows or ought to know that the proposed
transaction is excessively one-sided'82 or that he is making a misleading state-
ment of opinion on which the consumer is likely to rely to his detriment. 183
Both of these additional specifications may be unnecessary. The first is prob-
ably redundant given the protection against "inequitable" transactions 4 and
the second appears to add nothing to the protections already provided by
the deceptive practices shopping list. 85
There is, however, a significant addition in the Ontario and Saskatche-
wan unconscionability listing that is lacking in the other two enactments. The
Ontario and Saskatchewan lists include a protection against the situation
where a supplier knew or ought to have known that the consumer would be
unable to receive a "substantial benefit" from the subject-matter of the con-
sumer transaction. 18 An example of conduct that would be in violation of
this particular provision is the sale of two expensive vacuum cleaners to two
low-income families whom the salesman knows share the same apartment
and the same rug.8 7 Other examples of similar abuses will undoubtedly occur
to the reader.
In sum, the unconscionable practices shopping lists provide considerable
variance. Ontario's listing consists of eight specific categories, Saskatchewan
has six, B.C. five, and Alberta two. The interesting question is whether a
comprehensive trade practices enactment even needs this type of listing with
respect to unconscionable, as opposed to deceptive, practices. In the case of
deception, the "shopping list" is more of a definitional exercise where suffi-
cient precision with respect to such issues as total and unit price prominence,
non-availability of product, or prior history and usage, is attainable. A speci-
fication of unconscionable arts or practices, however, will invariably result
in a listing of generalities. The very concept of unconscionability is a highly
open-textured one and any listing of "undue pressure" or "excessive one-
sidedness" may add nothing more to the existing common law than codified
uncertainty. Indeed the argument could be made that there already is ade-
181 B.C. Act, s. 3(2) (e); Ontario Act, s. 2(b) (vi); Saskatchewan Act, s. 4(2) (d).
Example: the one-sided adhesion contract which contains a disclaimer of all warranties
clause or other fineprint "boiler plate" clauses that render the bargain harsh and
inequitable. See UCSPA, s. 4(c) (5) and Comment.
182 Ontario Act, s. 2(b) (v). A similar protection is included in the Saskatchewan
Act, s. 4(2)(d).
183 Ontario Act, s. 2(b) (vii).
1841d., s. 2(b)(vi).
18 5 Id., s. 2(a)(xiii).
186 Ontario Act, s. 2(b)(iii); Saskatchewan Act, s. 4(2)(b). And see UCSPA,
s. 4(c)(3).
187 UCSPA Comment to s. 4(c)(3).
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quate common law protection against the very practices that would be speci-
fied in a statutory "shopping list." The Anglo-Canadian judiciary has not
stood idly by when confronted with cases involving sharp practices or gross
over-reaching.188 The courts have, to a large extent, assumed an obligation to
police the marketplace and provide relief in cases of undue influence, duress,
exorbitant prices, and high-pressure sales practices. 8 9 Recent developments
indicate a revitalization of a generalized principle of unconscionability19 0
Lord Denning, in Lloyd's Bank v. Bundy,191 suggested that the principle
underlying and ultimately unifying these various categories of actionability
was really "inequality of bargaining power."192 Several Canadian judges have
already adopted Lord Denning's perspective of the judicial obligation.198
Given this renaissance of common law concern about marketplace un-
conscionability, is the "shopping list" of suggested unconscionable practices
necessary? Why is a general prohibition inadequate?9 4 One response might
be that any judicial foray into questions of fair dealing or of equality of bar-
gaining power requires precise legislative guidance. 95 Related to this is the
concern that, increasingly, courts are acting as "roving commissions" bent
on setting aside those agreements whose substantive terms they find ob-
jectionable.196 Professor Richard Epstein has urged that any judicial utiliza-
tion of the doctrine of unconscionability should be restricted to questions of
"procedural unconscionability" such as duress or party capacity and should
not be extended into areas of "substantive unconscionability"; 197 that any
invitation to scrutinize questions of substantive unconscionability should be
specified through legislation. In my view, the "shopping lists" of unconscion-
able practices were in fact necessary not only to codify and clarify the
"procedural" abuses that were actionable at common law but also to specify
188 See generally the Trebilcock Study, supra, note 7 at 242-260.
189 See, for example, Gaertner v. Fiesta Dance Studios Ltd. (1973), 32 D.L.R.
(3d) 639; Pridmore v. Calvert (1975), 54 D.L.R. (3d) 133; McKenzie v. Bank of
Montreal et al. (1975), 55 D.L.R. (3d) 641, affd. (1976), 70 D.L.R. (3d).
'
9 0 Waddams, Unconscionability in Contracts (1976), 39 Modern L.R. 369.
191 [1974] 3 W.L.R. 501.
192 Id. at 508.
193 See, for example, McKenzie v. Bank of Montreal et al., supra, note 189, and
Black v. Wilcox (1976), 70 D.L.R. (3d) 192 (Ont. C.A.).
194 Examples of the general prohibition approach can be found in the Uniform
Commercial Code, s. 2-302, the Uniform Consumer Credit Code, s. 6.111 and the
Quebec Consumer Protection Act, S.Q. 1971, c. 74, s. 118.
19 5 Kornhauser, Unconscionability in Standard Forms (1976), 64 Calif. L.R. 1151
at 1183.
196 Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical Reappraisal, 18 J. Law & Econ. 293
at 294.
19 7Id. at 315: ... when the doctrine of unconscionability is used in its substantive
dimension, be it in a commercial or consumer context, it serves only to undercut the
private right of contract in a manner that is apt to do more social harm than good."
The distinction between "procedural" and "substantive" unconscionability is explored
by Leff, supra, note 11 at 489 et seq. Also see Leff, Unconscionability and the Crowd -
Consumers and the Common Law Tradition (1970), 31 U. Pitt. L.R. 349.
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new and important "substantive unconscionability" categories such as no
probability of full payment 98 or no substantial benefit.109
If the listing of unconscionable practices is indeed meaningful, can there
be any improvement upon the open-textured quality of the itemizations? Or
should one be content to rely upon judicial interpretation as the exclusive
source of guidance? It may be that much of the anxiety that has developed
with respect to judicial interpretation of such open-textured concepts as "un-
due pressure," "substantial benefit," or "excessive one-sidedness" is unjusti-
fied. The judiciary has long been familiar with the challenge of interpreting
broadly worded unconscionability provisions. One apposite example has been
the judicial effort to carefully articulate those factors that were thought to be
relevant to a finding of unconscionability under provincial unconscionable
transactions relief legislation. 200 There is good reason to believe that similar
judicial guidelines could evolve in the interpretation of the trade practices
legislation.20' This is not to say, however, that judicial fiat should be the only
source of guidance for the interpretation of the "shopping list" prohibitions.
I would argue that the ideal interpretive vehicle would be a rule-making
power that could be vested in the appropriate Minister. This suggestion, how-
ever, raises questions of considerable complexity which are explored more
thoroughly in the analysis of administrative remedies. 02
(d) Additions and Exemptions
Any "shopping list" of deceptive or unconscionable practices deemed to
be unfair and in violation of the trade practices enactment should not be
closed. There ought to be some provision delegating to the Lieutenant
Governor-in-Council the power to add to it by regulation. This delegation
of responsibility to the executive would permit timely response to innovative
marketplace abuses.
Only two of the provincial enactments contain provisions to this effect.
The B.C. Act permits the Lieutenant Governor-in-Council to prescribe by
regulation any new additions to both the "deceptive" 203 and the "unconscion-
able" practices shopping lists.20 4 The Ontario Act permits additions only to
the "deceptive" listing.205 In the Alberta and Saskatchewan enactments there
is no provision for additions through executive regulation. In the latter enact-
ment, however, the Lieutenant Governor-in-Council is empowered to make
198 Supra, note 180 and accompanying text.
199 Supra, note 186 and accompanying text.
20OSupra, note 102. And see particularly the judgment of Sweet Co. Ct. J., in
Morehouse v. Income Investments Ltd. (1965), 53 D.L.R. (2d) 106.
201tThe general capacity of the judiciary to develop meaningful guidelines in the
area of unconscionability is discussed favourably by Waddams, supra, note 190 at
391-393. Contra, Leff, supra, note 197, 31 U. Pitt. L.R. at 354.
202 Infra, sub-part 4.
203 B.C. Act, ss. 2(3)(5) and 32(n).
2041d., ss. 3(2)(f) and 32(o).
205 Ontario Act, ss. 2(c) and 16(c).
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regulations "defining" any words or expressions not defined in the Act.206
This power to extend definitionally the scope of the "shopping list" may
functionally serve the same purpose as the power to add by regulation.
There is one feature of this question of adding by regulation that de-
serves some discussion. Section 16(2) of the Ontario enactment uniquely
provides that any regulation enacted by the Lieutenant Governor-in-Council
whereby an addition is made to the deceptive practices listing "expires with
the prorogation of the resumed session or of the next ensuing session as the
case may be."2 0 7 The purpose of this provision is to enable the cabinet to
enact regulations while the legislature is recessed. However, in the absence of
subsequent positive legislative endorsement, these regulations would auto-
matically expire upon the prorogation of the next ensuing session. While such
automatic rescission protection would commend itself to those of us who find
greater safeguards in legislative than in executive action, it could have a very
negative effect. Uncertainty and inconsistency may be the only real conse-
quence of Ontario's automatic rescission proviso. As the recent report to the
federal Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs suggested:
Section 16 [of the Ontario enactment] will result, in the event of Parliament's
failure to formally validate existing rules, in certain forms of conduct being
illegal one moment and legal the next. Moreover the invalidation of rules will, in
cases of parliamentary inadvertence, bear no relation to the urgency of the need
for which they were originally designed to cater. Where rules expire in this way,
while the original need for them continues, they will have to be promulgated
anew. In the interim, individuals will remain free to engage in conduct which
may result in substantial injury to consumers. 20 8
Automatic rescission of regulations which fail to gain subsequent legislative
endorsement through inadvertence is a wholly inappropriate device in a con-
sumer trade practices enactment. Section 16(2) should be reconsidered and
repealed.
The same can be said about the "exemption by regulation" provisions.
Each of the trade practices enactments permits the Lieutenant Governor-
in-Council to exempt certain suppliers or types of consumer transactions from
the operation and application of the legislation. 20 9 The rationale for an ex-
emption provision is related to the overall concern that a trade practices
enactment be sufficiently responsive to unforeseen contingencies.210 But what
unforeseen eventualities could justify relieving a supplier from the obligation
to adhere to the fair sales practice requirements of the legislation? Even if
one could hypothesize a situation where the public interest could tolerate
business conduct that is in violation of the trade practices enactment, why
should exemption be available simply by executive action? The safer and
20GSaskatchewan Act, s. 28(e).
207 Ontario Act, s. 16(2).
208 Trebilcock Study, supra, note 7 at 160-161.
209 B.C. Act, s. 32(c); Ontario Act, s. 16(l)(d); Alberta Act, s. 21(c); Saskatche-
wan Act, s. 28(a).
210)The need for "flexibility" was emphasized by the Hon. John Clement, Minister
of Consumer and Commercial Relations, during debate of the Ontario Act. See Ont.
Leg. Deb. (November 28, 1974) at 5866.
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politically more accountable approach would place any exempting power with
the full legislature; otherwise, an unnecessary temptation for "back door pres-
sures" continues to persist. When the point was debated in Ontario, the
Parliamentary Assistant to the Minister of Consumer and Commercial Rela-
tions reassured the legislature that "there would be no exemptions and no
exclusions under the regulatory section. That's a matter of record; that's a
commitment... ."211 Unfortunately, the motion to amend this regulation-
making provision by deleting the exemption power was dismissed as "faceti-
ous.,,212
3. The Range of Private Remedies
It is beyond dispute that a right provided by law can only be as strong
as the remedy accorded for its enforcement and vindication. The difference
between effective consumer protection legislation and legislation that is mere-
ly symbolic or "name-only" 213 is often a difference in the range and adequacy
of the remedies that are statutorily provided. The analysis of the remedies
provided in each of the provincial trade practice enactments will materially
influence one's evalution of that enactment.
Ideally, a consumer trade practices enactment should provide the appro-
priate mix of civil, administrative, and criminal remedies that will ensure "the
greatest deterrence to economic offenders, the maximum protection and bene-
fits to victims and the best satisfaction of the public need to perceive that
justice is being done.1214 This mixture of private and public remedial strate-
gies is a reflection of the realization that the most effective response to
marketplace abuse is three-pronged: consumer-initiated civil actions, adminis-
trative enforcement by government and, as a last resort, the criminal sanction.
The private or consumer-initiated remedy will be considered first, not
only because this approach lends itself to a more sensible discussion of the
administrative remedies and the criminal sanction, but also because, in my
view, a broader recognition of the desirability of private action by individual
consumers is required. Statutory encouragement of private actions, either to
recover actual losses or to obtain injunctive or declaratory relief, would
provide both a convenient and psychologically satisfying vehicle of redress
for the motivated consumer and a cost-saving opportunity for the invariably
under-staffed and poorly funded governmental enforcing authority.215 The
desirability of a broader emphasis in trade practices legislation upon private
2 11 Mr. Frank Drea M.P.P., Ont. Leg. Deb. (February 7, 1975) at 7410.
-012 Id.
2 1 3 Supra, note 10.
214 Geis and Edelhertz, supra, note 2.
215 See generally Note, An Act to Prohibit Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices,
supra, note 23 at 146-147.
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action is in essence a reflection of the growing realization that "private
attorneys general" may well be the best vindicators of the public interest.216
To encourage the utilization of civil remedies in cases of consumer loss
or injury, statutory reform of several barriers existing at common law is
necessary. Overall, the common law "has the means and the flexibility, if
applied intelligently and imaginatively, to afford redress to a consumer in
most cases of deception or unconscionability." 217 However, two procedural
obstacles should be removed. The first is the long-outmoded and increasingly
ignored parol evidence rule which effectively precludes the admissibility of
any oral evidence of representations or inducements which adds to, varies, or
contradicts the terms of the written contract. The parol evidence rule, insofar
as it relates to consumer transactions, has been resoundingly criticized in the
literature218 The justification for extending the scope of the contract to in-
clude any representation made by the supplier and relied upon by the con-
sumer inducing the latter to enter into the transaction, whether or not such
representation was made orally, is surely too obvious to pursue. Indeed, it is
fair to say that the illogicality of the parol evidence rule, as well as its
consequent injustice, has prompted a sizeable erosion of the rule by the
courts.219 However, to ensure judicial uniformity,220 it is necessary to "for-
malize the massive erosion 22' 1 and abolish the parol evidence rule. Three of
the provincial trade practices enactments have expressly abolished the rule,
222
while the fourth, Alberta, has done so by implication.
223
The second procedural obstacle that requires statutory abolition is the
privity doctrine. This matter has already been discussed in some detail.
224
Suffice it to say that a modern consumer trade practices enactment ought to
make it clear that the notion of contractual privity will not impede an other-
216 See Lovett, Private Actions for Deceptive Trade Practices (1971), 23 Admin.
L.R. 271 at 273 and 285; Note, Private Remedies Under the Consumer Fraud Acts
(1972), 67 Nw. U.L.R. 413; Dole, Merchant and Consumer Protection: The Uniform
Deceptive Trade Practices Act, supra, note 28 at 506; Lovett, supra, note 23 at 743 and
749.
2 1 7 Trebilcock Study, supra, note 7 at 275. Also at 280.
218 See Report on Consumer Warranties, supra, note 81 at 29 et seq. and Trebilcock
Study, supra, note 7 at 230: "Mhe rule has no place in the consumer marketplace
where, commonly, reliance is placed not upon the terms of a printed form contract but
upon the representations, oral or otherwise, which induce the making of the contract."
The relevant critiques are collected at 288, n. 114.
219 Curtis v. Chemical Cleaning and Dyeing Co. Ltd. (1951), 1 K.B. 805; City
and Westminister Properties Ltd. v. Mudd, [1958] 2 All E.R. 733; Mendelssohn v.
Normand, Ltd., [1969] 3 All E.R. 1215. Generally discussed in Trebilcock Study, supra,
note 7 at 228-229.
22 0 There has been the odd consumer case where the parol evidence rule has been
applied with full vigour: see e.g., Allen v. Danforth Motors Ltd. (1958), 12 D.L.R. (2d)
572 (Ont. C.A.)
221 Trebilcock Study, supra, note 7 at 230.
222 B.C. Act, s. 27; Ontario Act, s. 4(7); Saskatchewan Act, s. 22.
223Alberta Act, s. 4(1)(d).
224 Supra, notes 81 to 87 and accompanying text.
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wise appropriate civil action. As noted earlier,2 25 three of the provincial stat-
utes have expressly abolished the doctrine of privity; 22 the Ontario enactment
is deficient in this respect.227
Procedural difficulties aside, what is the range of private remedies pro-
vided by the trade practices legislation? In analyzing and evaluating this
aspect of the problem, I propose to consider the following: (a) the availabili-
ty of injunctive and declaratory relief, (b) rescission, damages and related
remedies, and (c) incentives for private action.
(a) Injunctive and Declaratory Relief
Although the utility of a private injunctive or declaratory remedy has
been questioned by at least two commentators, 228 on the whole, the literature
has wholeheartedly endorsed the private injunction or declaration as a benefi-
cial counterpart to the preventive administrative remedies available to the
governmental enforcing authority.229 Indeed, there is no cogent reason to
deny the injunctive or declaratory remedy to the private consumer litigant.
Any fears that such availability would prompt a flood of frivolous litigation
have proved unfounded.2 30
Nonetheless, three of the provincial trade practice enactments have
proceeded cautiously on this point. Alberta has provided for private injunc-
tive and declaratory relief against unfair practices in two instances: where
the consumer litigant can show that he had entered into a consumer trans-
action and had suffered damage or loss as a consequence of the unfair act or
practice 231 or, where the consumer litigant is a "consumer organization"
defined so as to require non-profit incorporation.M These prerequisites for
actual agreement or for incorporation have already been critically analyzed.238
To Alberta's credit, there is provision for an interim injunction requiring the
applicant to establish "a prima facie case of the existence of an unfair act or
practice being committed by the defendant supplier" and relieving the appli-
cant of any need to show irreparable harm.234 Here again the above-mentioned
prerequisites and criticisms are relevant. The other cautious provinces are
Saskatchewan, which allows declaratory relief but not injunctive, 23 and
Ontario which predictably, but unjustifiably, provides neither.23 ,
2 25Id.
226B.C. Act, s. 1(1) "supplier"; Alberta Act, s. 1(h); Saskatchewan Act, s. 15(1).
227T Supra, notes 86 and 87 and accompanying text.
228Travers and Landers, The Consumer Class Action (1970), 18 Kan. L.R. 811
at 814-15, cited in Rice, supra, note 33 at 384, n. 65.
229 See generally the articles cited, supra, note 216.
230 Zysblat, supra, note 160 at 104.
2 31 Alberta Act, ss. 11(1) and 2(a)(e).
232 Alberta Act, s. 14.
2 3 3 Supra, notes 124 to 129 and accompanying text.
234 Alberta Act, s. 15.
2 35 Saskatchewan Act, s. 15(1)(f).
236 Cf. UCSPA, s. 11(a) which permits consumer-initiated injunctive or decla-
ratory relief whether or not the consumer has suffered any actual loss or damage.
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The broadest and most commendable approach to the question of con-
sumer-initiated applications for injunctions or declarations is in the B.C. Act.
Section 16 provides that any person, whether or not that person has a special,
or any interest, or is even affected by a consumer transaction, has standing
to bring an action for either an interim or permanent injunction or a declara-
tion with respect to any supplier's actual or attempted unfair act or practice.
m 7
Where the litigant is successful, the court is empowered to order the supplier
to advertise the particulars of any such judgment in the media.238 But have
the courts responded adequately to these statutory innovations and onus
shifts? This particular question masks a more general concern about the
appropriateness of the curial body in the implementation of a comprehensive
trade practices regulatory scheme and is discussed more fully in Part D of
this article239
(b) Rescission, Damages and Related Remedies
The most important aspect of the private remedy provisions in a con-
sumer trade practices enactment will be the range of relief available to a
consumer who has been induced by an unfair act or practice to enter into a
consumer transaction, and, as a consequence, has suffered injury or loss.
A comprehensive recovery of loss provision (found in at least thirty-eight
American state trade practices statutes) 240 should provide for rescissionary
relief, full recovery of restitutionary reliance, and expectation losses, punitive
or exemplary damages, and a flexibly worded direction empowering the court
to make such other orders or judgments as may be necessary to achieve a just
result.241 This suggested range of remedies is provided in three of the provin-
cial trade practices enactments. The B.C.,242 Alberta, 243 and Saskatchewan 44
provisions are generally comparable in substance if not in form. The only
significant point of contrast is the availability of punitive or exemplary dam-
ages.24 5 The B.C. and Alberta enactments 246 permit the award of punitive
2 3 7 B.C. Act, s. 16. Section 17 provides that in any application under s. 16 for an
interim injunction, the court "shall give greater weight, importance and the balance of
convenience to the protection of consumers than to the carrying on of the business of
the supplier." Furthermore, the application "need not establish that irreparable harm
will be done... if the interim injunction is not granted."
2 3 B.C. Act, s. 16(1).
239 Part D, infra.
240 The thirty-eight American states having such provisions in their trade practices
legislation are listed in the Trebilcock Study, supra, note 7 at 117.
241 One model of flexibly worded direction to the courts to provide such relief
"as the court deems necessary and proper" is s. 3-406 of the Model Act, supra, note
215 at 151.
242 B.C. Act, s. 20(1).
243 Alberta Act, ss. 11(1)(2).
244 Saskatchewan Act, s. 15(2).
245 The appropriateness of the punitive or exemplary damages award is discussed
generally in Rice, Exemplary Damages in Private Consumer Actions (1969), 55 Iowa
L.R. 307. Also see Lovett, supra, note 216 at 286 and supra, note 23 at 745 and at 748.
240 B.C. Act, s. 20(1) (a); Alberta Act, s. 11 (2) (c).
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damages without restriction. A Saskatchewan court's punitive damages award,
however, is limited to those cases where the supplier had committed a "willful
and knowing" violation of the Act.247
Thus far, any discussion of the recovery of loss provision in the Ontario
Act has been avoided, and for good reason. Unlike the clarity of language
found in the other enactments, the Ontario Act's recovery of loss provision
displays a numbing disregard for legislative lucidity. It is worthwhile to
excerpt the critical provision in full:
4. (1) Subject to subsection 2, any agreement, whether written, oral or implied,
entered into by a consumer, after a consumer representation that is an unfair
practice and that induced the consumer to enter into the agreement,
(a) may be rescinded by the consumer and the consumer is entitled to any
remedy therefor that is at law available, including damages; or
(b) where rescission is not possible because restitution is no longer possible,
or because rescission would deprive a third party of a right in the subject-
matter of the agreement that he has acquired in good faith and for value,
the consumer is entitled to recover the amount by which the amount paid
under the agreement exceeds the fair value of the goods or services received
under the agreement or damages, or both.
(2) Where the unfair practice referred to in subsection 1 comes within clause b
of section 2, the court may award exemplary or punitive damages. 248
It is difficult to discern whether the provision's lexical convolutions were the
result of hurried inadvertence or of deliberative draftsmanship disclosing a
legislative intention to provide a less than comprehensive civil remedy. The
latter suggestion becomes increasingly plausible as one re-reads s. 4(1). There
is no difficulty with the opening paragraph of s. 4(1): where a consumer has
been induced by an unfair practice to enter into an agreement, he is given
the right to rescind the agreement. This rescissionary remedy is self-executing,
and, unlike the B.C., Alberta, or Saskatchewan provisions, does not require
application to a court.2 49 There is also little difficulty with s. 4(1) (b): where
the impossibility of restitutio or where third party rights would preclude
rescission, the consumer is entitled to recover the difference between the
amount he has already paid to the supplier and the "fair value" of the goods
or services received under the agreement. This recovery would not include
consequential losses. However, s. 4(1) (b) concludes with the phrase "or
damages, or both." One would hope that this additional alternative would be
judicially interpreted to permit the recovery of reasonably foreseeable con-
sequential losses as well as the specified "fair value" difference. Otherwise,
why would the draftsman have added these words? 210
The more critical issue of statutory interpretation relates to the language
of s. 4(1) (a). There are really two questions: (1) can the consumer claim
damages without having to rescind the agreement? (2) whether or not rescis-
247 Saskatchewan Act, s. 15(2) (b).
248 Ontario Act, ss. 4(1) and (2).
249 Id.
250 The question of "measure of damages" and the failure of the Ontario Act to
provide any direction on this matter is discussed, infra, notes 263 to 266 and accom-
panying text.
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sion is a prerequisite under s. 4(1) (a), what is meant by "any remedy that
is at law available, including damages"? The first question is of concern to
the consumer who would prefer to retain the goods and merely sue to recover
his losses. Is this permitted? One would think that if damages are allowable
where third party rights or the impossibility of restitutio in integrum has pre-
cluded rescission,251 then a fortiori they ought to be allowed where the inno-
cent consumer voluntarily decides to forego his rescissionary right. Otherwise,
consumers would be compelled to proceed under s. 4(1) (b) innovatively
ensuring that restitution was no longer possible. The single question for a
court, of course, will be whether to read "and" in s. 4(1) (a) disjunctively or
conjunctively. It is submitted that the former interpretation is preferable.252
The second question relating to the interpretation of s. 4(1) (a) is more
difficult. What did the legislature intend by providing that "the consumer is
entitled to any remedy therefor, that is at law available, including damages."253
What are the implications of the "at law" restriction? Would the consumer,
for example, be denied a remedy in damages with respect to losses arising
out of an unfair act or practice that appears solely in the "nconscionability"
shopping list?254 The court might well conclude that the traditional non-
availability of the damages remedy in cases of mere unconscionability should
be maintained, given the "at law" restriction of s. 4(1) (a), where the
consumer's sole basis for complaint is a s. 2(b) violation. Indeed, a literal
reading of the provision would compel this interpretation which, if correct,
discloses a legislative denial of any suggestion that the Ontario enactment
is in any way progressive. 255
A further example of the undue caution permeating those few conces-
sions to consumer protection granted by the Ontario Act is s. 4(2). The
judicial award of punitive damages is limited to those cases where the unfair
practice is an "unconscionable consumer representation. 256 This restriction
of punitive damages awards to cases of unconscionability and their non-
2 5 1 Ontario Act, s. 4(1)(b).
252 It would indeed be remarkable if a trade practices statute that was intended to
provide a comprehensive protection to consumers suffering loss or injury as a con-
sequence of unfair sales practices was interpreted as denying the consumer a simple
damages remedy.
2 5 3 Ontario Act, s. 4(1) (a). (Emphasis added.)
2 5 4 Ontario Act, s. 2(b). See, supra, notes 177 to 187 and accompanying text.
255 This criticism is supported by the fact that the First Draft of s. 4(1) was
reasonably straight-forward:
Any agreement... entered into by a consumer after a consumer representation
that includes an unfair practice is voidable by the consumer and each supplier
is liable and jointly and severally liable with each other supplier to the consumer
for any moneys paid under the agreement and for any damages incurred by the
consumer as a result of the unfair practice. (Emphasis added.)
See Bill 55, An Act to Prohibit Unfair Practices in Sales to Consumers, (4th Session,
29th Legislat., Ont. 23 Eliz. II, 1974). By First Reading this provision had been re-
drafted into the present ss. 4(1)(a) and (b). In this writer's view, both the re-drafting
and the particular language employed reflect a deliberate effort to provide a restricted
private remedy.
2 6 Ontario Act, s. 4(2).
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availability in cases where there has been a violation of the deceptive prac-
tices shopping list is difficult to understand, particularly since there is no
compelling conceptual basis for differentiating the latter from the former.257
Indeed, in the Ontario enactment, at least one deceptive practice is expressly
categorized under the list of unconscionable practices. 258 Equally perplexing
is the short limitation period imposed in the Ontario enactment. The remedies
provided in s. 4(1) must be claimed "within six months after the agreement
is entered into." 259 This imposition of a six-month limitation period is unique
in North America. Most trade practice enactments provide for a two-year60
or, in some cases, a three-year20 ' limitation period. The absurdity of the six-
month time limit was emphasized during the debate of this provision in the
Ontario LegislatureG2 but again without consequence.
One final point should be made in relation to the range of private
remedies provided by the various provincial trade practice enactments. The
only enactment containing a meaningful direction with respect to the method
of calculating or measuring the damages recoverable is Saskatchewan's, which
allows recovery of "any losses that were reasonably foreseeable as likely to
result from the unfair or unconscionable act or practice."2 0 The other three
enactments are silent as to the appropriate measure.264 Perhaps the response
of an Ontario M.P.P. during the debate of this point is typical: "measures of
damages should be determined by the courts - that's their job.".215 Unfor-
tunately this sanguine view of judicial responsiveness, when coupled with
unnecessary statutory obscurity,2 66 often results in further legislative involve-
ment to clarify confusion that ought not to have arisen.
257Supra, note 146 and accompanying text.
258 The making of a misleading statement of opinion on which the consumer is
likely to rely to his detriment: Ontario Act, s. 2(b) (vii).
259 Ontario Act, s. 4(5). The Act requires that any consumer intending to avail
himself of a remedy provided in s. 4(1) must give notice of such in writing to the
other party to the agreement. Section 4(6), however, may be unnecessarily restrictive
in its requirement that the notice must be delivered personally or sent by registered
mail. The First Draft of Bill 55, supra, note 255, s. 4(5) required that "notice" be
given but did not prescribe mandatory procedures.
2607or example, UCSPA, supra, note 33, s. 11(h).
261 The California Consumers Legal Remedies Act, supra, note 120, s. 1783.
262 Ont. Leg. Deb. (Nov. 28, 1974) at 5830. The more controversial aspect of the
six month limitation period is the fact that the time period begins as soon as the
consumer has entered into the agreement. In many cases the nature and extent of the
supplier's deceptive act or practice may not be discovered until seven or eight months
or perhaps even a year has passed. It would be eminently more sensible to begin a
limitation period after the consumer first became aware of the unfair practice. The
First Draft of Bill 55, supra, note 255, s. 4(5) provided that in the case of a
"deceptive" act or practice the consumer could seek a statutory remedy "within three
months after the consumer became aware of the unfair practice"; and, in the case of
an "unconscionable" act or practice, the consumer had to act "within six months after
the agreement [was] entered into." Here again, re-drafting meant restriction.
263 Saskatchewan Act, s. 15(2) (a).
264 See B.C. Act, s. 20(1); Alberta Act, s. 11((2)(b); Ontario Act, s. 4(1).
265 Mr. Frank Drea M.P.P., Ont. Leg. Deb. (February 6, 1975) at 7361.
260 Especially evident in the Ontario Act, s. 4(1), discussed, supra.
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(c) Incentives for Private Action
An individual consumer's recourse to private action may prove to be
non-existent if the financial disincentives that presently exist are not elimi-
nated. One cannot expect the individual consumer to initiate costly litigation
to recover losses arising out of a deceptive or unconscionable trade practice
in any case where the inconvenience and expense of such action loom as
formidable barriers. Yet these financial disincentives will effectively preclude
private action in the vast majority of cases involving unfair trade practices.267
In order to neutralize the disincentives that continue to discourage the use of
private remedies, a modem trade practices enactment should specifically
provide both financial and procedural incentives for consumer-initiated litiga-
tional efforts.
The financial incentive might be a minimum recovery provision. Several
American enactments including the Uniform Consumer Sales Practices Act2 6 8
provide for minimal recoveries ranging from $25 to $200. To date, none of
the provincial trade practices statutes have adopted this feature. A minimum
recovery provision allowing, for example, "actual damages or one hundred
dollars whichever is greater,"269 would be an important addition to the Cana-
dian enactments and could provide a necessary incentive in a case where a
private action for the recovery of losses arising out of an unconscionable or
deceptive trade practice would not be financially worthwhile.270
A complementary procedural incentive that would minimize the financial
barriers that continue to impede effective private consumer litigation is the
class action. The class action device has become in recent years a highly
controversial and much-discussed topic for both legal scholarship and law
reform. Literally hundreds of articles on this issue have appeared in the law
reviews.271 The most recent and the most thorough Canadian analysis is
Professor Neil J. Williams' excellent study that was first commissioned by the
federal Department of Consumer and Corporate Affairs2 72 and has now been
published as a general study of consumer class actions in Canada.273 It is
267 "It is generally agreed that the greatest incidence and impact of deceptive and
unconscionable practices are found in the low-income consumer market." Rice, supra,
note 33 at 377. Also see Schrag, Bleak House 1968: A Report on Consumer Tort Liti-
gation (1969), 44 N.Y.U.L.R. 115 and Lovett, Private Actions for Deceptive Trade
Practices, supra, note 216 at 273.
2068 Supra, note 33.
269 UCSPA, supra, note 33, s. 11(b).
270 Trebilcock Study, supra, note 7 at 218.
2 71 The most recent American analysis is an excellent but lengthy note in the
Harvard Law Review. See Developments in the Law - Class Actions (1976), 89 Harv.
L.R. 1319. This 325-page Note makes reference to all of the important articles in the
American literature.
272 See Williams, Damages Class Action Under the Combines Investigation Act in
A Proposal for Class Actions Under Competition Policy Legislation (Ottawa, Depart-
ment of Consumer and Corporate Affairs, Bureau of Competition Policy, 1976).
273 Williams, Consumer Class Actions in Canada - Some Proposals for Reform
(1975), 13 Osgoode Hall L.J. 1.
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not my intention to provide yet another approbative exegesis of the appropri-
ateness of the class action vehicle in consumer protection legislation. The
advantages of the class action mechanism and its potential for maximizing
cost-efficiency, facilitating full compensation, and achieving effective deter-
rence have been explored in the literature.274 The justification for a mass
redress procedure that would permit consumers to aggregate their common
grievances under a single collective suit is surely beyond dispute.
[In] many situations the class action is the only effective private remedy that
exists for consumers who have been damaged by the same business practice,
especially where individual losses are small. Without the class action, consumers
will be denied compensation and perhaps equally as important the merchant
responsible for their loss will be permitted to keep profits gained from activities
which, at the very least, do not conform to accepted standards of business
behaviour. There is a special justification for arming consumers with a weapon
to establish and enforce business standards as every member of society is a
consumer and all will stand to benefit from the exercise. A vital and potential
class action procedure in the hands of the public would help influence the forces
that control the marketplace to be more responsive to the need to act fairly and
not exploit their position.2 75
Whether the consumer class action vehicle is enacted as part of an omnibus
class action statute276 or simply as a revision to the Rules of Court, 27 7 the
necessary legislative approbation is inevitable.278 However, one can only
speculate as to when the procedural dark ages will end. Until such time as
omnibus class action legislation is enacted, it may be worthwhile to include
a mass redress provision in consumer trade practices legislation. At least
fifteen American states have authorized consumer class actions.27 9 The same
274 See, for example, Whybrow, The Case For Class Actions in Canadian Compe-
tition Policy: An Economist's Viewpoint in A Proposal for Class Actions, supra, note
272. Another helpful economic analysis is Dam, Class Actions: Efficiency, Compensa-
tion, Deterrence and Conflict of Interests (1975), 4 J. Leg. Stud. 47. Also see Dole,
Consumer Class Actions Under the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act, supra, note
28 at 1103, and Starrs, The Consumer Class Action - Part 11. Considerations of Proce-
dure (1969), 49 B.U.L.R. 407 at 408-409.
275 Williams, supra, note 273 at 62-63.276 See Williams' Model Consumer Class Actions Act, supra, note 273, at 65
et seq. Also see Hinds, To Right Mass Wrongs: A Federal Consumer Class Action Act(1976), 13 Harv. J. Legis. 776.
277 This was the suggestion in the Report on Consumer Warranties, supra, note 81
at 108.
278 At time of writing, the Ontario Law Reform Commission's study on Class
Actions had begun soliciting the submission of briefs on all aspects of the class action
and in particular on the following issues: the advantages and disadvantages of class
actions; the protection of the various interests of the class representatives, the absentee
class members, the opposing party and the public interest by means of procedural safe-
guards; the assessment and distribution of damages; the question of costs; negotiated
settlements; the role of the class lawyer and professional responsibility; and alternatives
to the class action. The deadline for written briefs was April 30, 1977.279 The following listing appears in the Trebilcock Study, supra, note 7 at 117: Alaska,
California, Connecticut, Indiana, Kansas, Massachusetts, Missouri, New Hampshire, New
York, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, Texas, Utah and Wyoming. Also see Sebert, supra,
note 23 at 720 and Lovett, supra, note 23 at 746. The class action provisions of the
UDTPA, supra, note 28, and the UCSPA, supra, note 33, are analyzed in Dole, supra,
note 28, and in Rice, supra, note 33, respectively.
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ought to be available in the provincial trade practices enactments under dis-
cussion.
Unfortunately, only the B.C. Act has expressly provided for class actions
by consumers. Any person, regardless of "interest,"2 0 may bring an action
for declaratory or injunctive relief and, in doing so, may sue on behalf of
"consumers generally or on behalf of a designated class of consumers in the
Province. ' 281 The B.C. Act appears to limit the class action vehicle to decla-
rations and injunctions. However, s. 16(3) of the Act allows the court, in an
action for a permanent injunction, to restore to any person who has an interest
"any money or property ...that may have been acquired by reason of a
deceptive or unconscionable act or practice by the supplier. 282 When this
provision is coupled with the general class action provision,283 there appears
to be a statutory basis in the B.C. Act for class restitutionary recovery, if not
for damages generally. The Ontario, Saskatchewan and Alberta enactments
provide no mass redress procedures - not even for declaratory or injunctive
relief.284 The deficiency is a serious one. Until this legislation is amended to
permit a class action procedure it will continue to remain "the most retro-
grade in North America. 285 The legislatures' response to this consumer need
is more than mere procedural reform. In my view, the matter of class actions
"touches upon the credibility of our judicial system. 288
4. The Administrative Remedies
The importance of sound administrative or governmentally-initiated
remedies cannot be overstated. While private action may be economically
worthwhile and psychologically justifiable, comprehensive consumer trade
practices regulation cannot rely solely upon consumer policing of the market-
place. If each consumer were left to assert his rights alone, if and when he
felt sufficiently motivated, there would be at best a "random and fragmentary
2S0B.C. Act, s. 16(1).
281 Id., s. 16(2). Several commentators have suggested that "the class action works
best when injunctive relief, rather than damages, is sought." Eovaldi and Gestrin, supra,
note 10 at 293. Also see Starrs, supra, note 274 at 419.
282 B.C. Act, s. 16(3).
283 d., s. 16(2).
284 Under the Alberta Act a "consumer organization" is permitted to seek declara-
tory or injunctive relief [s. 14(1)]. See discussion, supra, notes 127 and 232 and ac-
companying text.
28 5 Mr. Patrick Lawlor M.P.P., Ont. Leg. Deb. (February 7, 1975) at 7402.
28S Weinstein, Some Reflections on the "Abusiveness" of Class Actions (1973),
58 Fed. Rules. D. 299 at 305. The full quote is as follows:
It seems to me that this matter touches upon the credibility of our judicial system.
Either we are committed to make reasonable efforts to provide a forum for the
adjudication of disputes involving all our citizens - including consumers - or
we are not.
Quoted in Cochran, Consumer Class Actions Under Wash. Rev. Code Ch. 19.86 - Still
An Effective Remedy (1975), 10 Gonzaga L.R. 633 at 649, n. 92.
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enforcement," if there were any at all.2 8 7 The realization that deceptive or
unconscionable trade practices are best regulated by combining private and
public responses prompted American legislative draftsmen to provide a regu-
latory structure that would give pre-eminence to the governmental enforcing
authority. The nature and extent of the administrative remedies accorded to
the enforcing authority reflected the concern that governmental enforcement
should be in the forefront in the battle against marketplace abuses.28  This
structural preference favouring governmental enforcement is also evident in
the Canadian trade practices legislation.
In each of the provincial enactments the designated governmental en-
forcing authority is the "director of trade practices.128 9 The Director's general
duties and obligations are described more or less uniformly in three of the
provincial enactments: enforcing the legislation, providing information for
consumers, receiving and acting on consumer complaints, acting as a medi-
ator, conducting relevant research, and maintaining a public record of any
actions taken.290 The primary responsibility of the Director is to enforce the
trade practices legislation. To facilitate this undertaking, a wide range of
necessary investigative powers are provided in each of the enactments. The
Director is empowered to commence an investigation whenever he has "rea-
son to believe" that a person has engaged, is engaging, or is about to engage
in a deceptive or unconscionable act or practice respecting a consumer trans-
action.2 91 The investigation may be conducted by the Director or by a person
appointed by him.2 92 Where necessary, the Director may apply ex parte to a
court for an order authorizing the entry and search of any premises and the
seizure of any documents that may be relevant to the determination of
whether or not the supplier under investigation has engaged or is engaging
in an unfair act or practice. 293 In cases where the Director has reason to
believe that the supplier is about to abscond, or that certain monies or other
assets are in danger of being dissipated in a manner that is prejudicial to
interested consumers, he may in writing or by telegram, order the appropriate
2 8 TKalvin and Rosenfield, The Contemporary Function of the Class Suit (1941),
8 U. Chi. L.R. 684 at 686, quoted in Sewell, Private and Public Remedies for Fraudu-
lent Business Practices in California: The Importance of a Strong Public Role (1973),
6 Loy. U.L.A.L. Rev. 312 at 318. Also see Rice, Remedies, Enforcement Procedures
and the Duality of Consumer Transaction Problems (1968), 48 B.U.L.R. 559 at 569.
2 8 8 See Lovett, supra, note 23 at 749.
289 B.C. Act, s. 1(1); Ontario Act, ss.1 (d) and 5; Alberta Act, s. 3; Saskatchewan
Act, s. 2. The comparable governmental authority in the various American jurisdictions
is noted in the Trebilcock Study, supra, note 7 at 118-119.
290 B.C. Act, s. 4; Ontario Act, s. 5; Saskatchewan Act, s. 6(1). The Alberta Act
does not list the Director's duties.
291B.C. Act, s. 8(1); Alberta Act, s. 5; Saskatchewan Act, s7(l). The Ontario
Act, s. 11(1) requires that the Director's belief be based on "reasonable and probable
grounds."
292 B.C. Act, s.9(1); Ontario Act, s.11(1); Saskatchewan Act, s.8(1). In the
Alberta Act, the Director's power to delegate his investigatory duties is provided for by
implication in s. 8.
293 B.C. Act, s. 9(4); Ontario Act, s. 11(4); Alberta Act, s. 7(l); Saskatchewan
Act, s. 8(5).
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party to refrain from dealing with these assets. 294 This capacity to "freeze"
the dispersion of trust funds or other assets is an essential component of most
consumer protection legislation that has consumer compensation as one of its
rationales. 295 In addition to these investigatory related powers, three of the
provincial enactments expressly empower the Director to apply to the court
for the appointment of a receiver.290
In general, the range of investigatory powers provided to the Director
by each of the provincial trade practices enactments is more or less uniform.
Two points of contrast are, however, evident. The Alberta Act is unnecessari-
ly weakened by its requirement that the Director first obtain the express
authorization of the provincial Attorney-General before any application for
a search warrant or any issuance of a "freeze order. '297 The B.C. Act, on
the other hand, may have accorded too great an independence to the enforc-
ing authority by providing a litigational immunity to the Director or his
agents or employees with respect to any loss or damage caused by any good
faith exercise of the powers given by the Act.298
Effective public enforcement of comprehensive consumer trade practices
legislation requires that at least the following administrative remedies be
available to the Director of Trade Practices: (a) the power to order the
immediate cessation of any unfair trade practice; (b) the capacity to negotiate
and enforce assurances of compliance voluntarily entered into by the sup-
plier; and (c) the ability to institute proceedings or assume the conduct of
proceedings on behalf of or in substitution for any consumer affected by a
supplier's unfair act or practice.
(a) The Cease and Desist Order
Prohibitory sanctions such as cease and desist orders or injunctions have
traditionally been the most prevalent means of formal state action against
unfair or deceptive business practices and they continue to be "the most
important formal enforcement tool. 2 99 The public enforcing authority can
utilize the injunction or cease and desist remedy as an immediate response
to actual or anticipated violations of the trade practices statute. Whether the
intervention is to prevent occurrence or repetition, the value of the prohibi-
294B.C. Act, s. 13(1); Ontario Act, s. 12(l); Saskatchewan Act, s. 11(1). The
Alberta Act, in s.9(1), requires an application by the Director to the court, although
this application may be ex parte.
295 Similar provisions are found in most of the provincial registration statutes. See,
for example, The Collection Agencies Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 71, s. 28; Mortgage Brokers
Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 278, s. 26; Motor Vehicle Dealers Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 475, s. 27;
Real Estate and Business Brokers Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 401, s. 29; Pyramidic Sales Act,
S.O. 1972, c. 57, s. 21; and Travel Industry Act, S.O. 1974, c. 115, as amended by S.O.
1976, c. 53, s. 21(a).
296 B.C. Act s. 13A; Alberta Act, s. 9(1)(d); Saskatchewan Act, s. 12(1).
297 Alberta Act, s. 19(1).
298 B.C. Act, s. 14(l). Quaere whether such grant of immunity is warranted and if
so, whether the "good faith" prerequisite is an adequate protection against possible abuse
of discretionary powers.
2 99 Sebert, supra, note 23 at 704.
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tory sanction both as an effective vehicle for policing the consumer market-
place and as a necessary concomitant to the Director's investigatory powers
is indisputable. It is not at all surprising, then, that any jurisdiction that has
provided for public enforcement of its trade practices statute will have pro-
vided the enforcing authority with an injunctive or similar prohibitory
remedy.30o
The more interesting question that arises from an analysis of the provin-
cial trade practices enactments is whether the prohibitory sanction should be
at the disposal of the Director alone or only available upon application to
a court of law. The B.C. and Alberta enactments require the latter,3 0' while
Ontario and Saskatchewan allow a Director-initiated cease and desist reme-
dy.302 Although the Director's application to the court for an interim injunc-
tion is facilitated in the B.C. and Alberta legislation by an express statutory
alteration of the traditional burden of proof requirements,803 on balance it
seems that the Director-initiated cease and desist order is a more appropriate
mechanism in the context of consumer trade practices regulation. At least two
inter-related reasons can be provided for this structural preference. First, even
an ex parte application for an interim injunction cannot be as immediate and
as convenient as the cease and desist order. Secondly, to require recourse to
the courts for injunctive relief is to run the serious risk that judges will con-
tinue to exercise their discretion as they have done traditionally, that is,
requiring proof of "irreparable harm" and consciously minimizing the force
of any statutory direction to do otherwise.304 The Director-initiated cease and
desist order is to be preferred.
Both Saskatchewan and Ontario provide the enjoined supplier with a
right to a hearing either before an appropriate tribunal0 5 or before the
Director himself.3 00 There is a possibility, however, of procedure thwarting
substance. In both jurisdictions the operation of the Director's cease and
3001 d., at 704, n. 74, for a listing of the relevant American jurisdictions.
8 01 B.C. Act, s. 16; Alberta Act, s. 12.
802 Ontario Act, s. 6(1); Saskatchewan Act, s. 14(1). This "cease and desist" feature
is not unique to Canadian consumer protection legislation. It can be found in many of
the provincial registration statutes. The particular registrar is empowered to order the
immediate cessation of the use by the registrant of any advertisements, circulars or
pamphlets which the registrar believes contains "false, misleading or deceptive state-
ments." See, e.g., the Motor Vehicle Dealers Act, R.S.O. 1970, c. 475 (as amended by
S.O. 1971, c. 50), s. 30. Similar provisions can be found in the registration statutes
listed, supra, note 295. Also see Saskatchewan's Department of Consumer Affairs Act,
S.S. 1972, c. 27, s. 8.
303 B.C. Act, s. 17, and, supra, note 237; Alberta Act, s. 15(2).
304 This problem is discussed, infra, in Part D: see note 403 and accompanying
text.
305 Ontario Act, s. 6(3). The hearing board is the Commercial Registration Appeal
Tribunal.
300 Saskatchewan Act, s. 14(2).
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desist order can be suspended by a supplier's timely appeal procedures.807
The Ontario Act has attempted to redress the balance somewhat by allowing
the Director to issue a cease and desist order which would take effect im-
mediately if, in the opinion of the Director, immediate compliance is
"necessary for the protection of the public."8 In this case, the cease and
desist order would not expire until fifteen days after receipt of the supplier's
request for a hearing. If the Commercial Registration Appeal Tribunal can
schedule the supplier's hearing date within this time period, the cease and
desist order may be extended until a judgment is rendered.30 9 The order for
immediate compliance is not available to the Saskatchewan Director.
The only criticism that can be levelled against the otherwise sensible cease
and desist remedy contained in the Ontario enactment is the absence of a
mechanism that would permit a consumer complainant to monitor the Direc-
tor's handling of the particular complaint. Where the Director has refused to
proceed on a matter, the consumer should be permitted to appeal this inaction
to the appropriate tribunal. This would ensure that a Director's refusal to
issue a cease and desist order would be susceptible to review and evaluation,
as is his decision to proceed.3 10 If the supplier can appeal to protect his
interests, why not allow a similar protection to the consumer? Unfortunately,
the proposed amendment to the Ontario Act which would have given a right
of appeal to consumers was defeated by the misguided belief that "the con-
sumer has all kinds of remedies in court."81'
(b) The Assurance of Voluntary Compliance
Voluntary compliance procedures, consent orders or, more simply,
AVC's, play an indispensable role in any effective program of public enforce-
ment of trade practices legislation.312 The assurance of voluntary compliance
is most often a happy middle ground whereby a good faith supplier under-
takes to discontinue the alleged unfair trade practice and to make appropriate
s0r Ontario Act, s. 6(5) provides that where a supplier, within fifteen days after
receiving the Director's notice, requires a hearing by the Tribunal, "the Tribunal may
by order direct the Director to carry out his proposal or to refrain from carrying out
his proposal...". Saskatchewan Act, s. 14(7) makes it clear that where a supplier has
requested a hearing with the Director, the latter's cease and desist order does not take
effect until there has been a hearing, reasons for the recission have been given and the
order has been served upon the supplier.
308 Ontario Act, s. 7(1).
309 Ontario Act, s. 7(4).
310 This safeguard is particularly important to Ontario and Saskatchewan con-
sumers since in neither case is the private injunctive remedy permitted. Supra, notes 235
and 236 and accompanying text.
811 Mr. Frank Drea M.P.P., Ont. Leg. Deb. (February 7, 1975) at 7401. The
defeat of this proposed amendment prompted Mr. Renwick to remark that "the par-
liamentary assistant has refused to accept even those very reasonable amendments which
have the support of all thinking people ... as you go along, you keep chipping away
at your bill, a bill which you say is for the protection of the consumer and yet you are
consistently turning down reasonable amendments which would help the consumer."
(at 7401).
812 Sebert, supra, note 23 at 708; Harrison, supra, note 23 at 434.
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amends to any aggrieved consumers; thus, the Director's office is spared the
costs of protracted injunction or cease and desist proceedings.313 While the
AVC is indeed a highly efficient enforcement measure which alone may
account for its uniform inclusion in nearly all trade practices legislation,814
its effectiveness depends to a large extent upon the Director's ability to give
legal effect to the supplier's assurances. Consequently, there has to be a
statutory acknowledgement that breach by the supplier of an AVC constitutes
a violation under the trade practices enactment and renders the supplier
liable to criminal prosecution.
Both the voluntary compliance procedure and the statutory recourse to
the criminal sanction where an AVC has been breached can be found in three
of the provincial trade practices enactmentsY'r, The Alberta Act is unique in
this respect in that while provision is made for what is called a "supplier's
undertaking," 31 16 non-compliance by the supplier with his given undertaking
will not attract the criminal sanction.3 17 A second deficiency evident in the
Alberta Act is the proviso that no AVC can be entered into without prior
authorization by the provincial Attorney-General. 318 The only commendable
aspect of the Alberta AVC provision is the specific statutory direction sug-
gesting that a "supplier's undertaking" may contain certain specific reassu-
rances relating to discontinuance of the unfair trade practice and redress of
consumer losses.319 Similar and, indeed, more detailed guidelines as to poten-
tial terms of the AVC are provided in both the B.C. and the Saskatchewan
enactments. 320 The Ontario Act is in this respect the most deficient, providing
simply that an assurance of voluntary compliance may include "such under-
takings as are acceptable to the Director.1321
(c) Substituted Actions
The commitment to effective public enforcement of a comprehensive
consumer sales practices law is not limited to prohibition or voluntary com-
pliance procedures. The Director of Trade Practices should assume the fur-
ther responsibility to act in a representative capacity on behalf of any aggrieved
313 The cost-saving features of the AVC are discussed more fully in Lovett, supra,
note 23 at 741. The fact that the AVC becomes a matter of public record is an equally
attractive feature: often a news release accompanies the entering into of an AVC thereby
putting the public on notice that the particular supplier has formally reassured the
Director that it will not engage in certain suspect activities. See Zimmering, Louisiana's
Consumer Protection Law - Three Years of Operation (1976), 50 Tul. L.R. 375 at 383.
314 At least thirty states now provide for AVC's in their trade practice legislation.
Harrison, supra, note 23 at 434, n. 205.
315 B.C. Act, ss. 15(1) and 25 (1)(d); Ontario Act, ss. 9(1) and 17(1)(c); Sas-
katchewan Act, ss. 13(1) and 18(1)(d).
316 Alberta Act, s. 10(1).
317 The Alberta Act lacks a general criminal sanction. See, infra, note 337 and
accompanying text.
318 Alberta Act, s. 19(1) and, supra, note 297 and accompanying text.
319 Alberta Act, s. 10(1) (c) (d).
320 B.C. Act, ss. 15(1)(c) - (j); Saskatchewan Act, s. 13(2).
321 Ontario Act, s. 9(3).
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consumer litigant. This provision for a "substituted action," whereby the re-
sources of the state are at the consumer's disposal, is the single most impor-
tant administrative measure to ensure that worthwhile consumer-initiated
litigational efforts are not abandoned. Vindication of the public interest re-
quires a combination of private and public remedies and, where necessary, a
substitution of the latter to ensure the viability of the former.322
The importance of the substituted action as a supplementary mechanism
to facilitate the efficient redress of consumer losses, whether individual or
class, has been recognized in at least forty American jurisdictions.323 Not
surprisingly, the American endorsements have influenced the drafting of the
Canadian provisions. The widest and indeed the most sensible approach to
the substituted action is found in the B.C. Act.3 24 If the Director is satisfied
that a consumer has sufficient grounds for litigation and that it is in the public
interest, he may intervene to institute proceedings, assume the conduct of any
proceedings brought against a supplier, or defend any proceedings brought
against the consumer.3 25 Prior to the Director's involvement, both the con-
sumer's and the Minister's written consent must be obtained. 326 Once such
consent is given by the consumer, the Director is empowered to conduct the
proceedings in such a manner as he considers appropriate and proper.3 27 Any
monies recovered by the Director are to be paid to the consumer 328 but the
costs, both for and against, remain with the Director.
329
The Alberta and Saskatchewan substituted action provisions are largely
similar.330 There is, however, one significant difference. The Alberta and
Saskatchewan Director is not able to utilize the substituted action to defend
the consumer in proceedings brought by a supplier. The B.C. Act, of
course, envisages the representative suit as both a sword and a shield.33'
Curiously, but perhaps predictably, the Ontario Act does not provide for a
substituted action. During the legislative debate on this matter, an amendment
adding the substituted action provision was proposed. Again, and without
any tenable explanation, this attempt to add some substance to an otherwise
lifeless consumer protection law was defeated. The opposition member who
saw this rejection of his motion as "another defeat for the consumer" and who
322 The common impediments to effective utilization of private remedies and the
attractiveness of the substituted action are discussed in Sewell, supra, note 287 at 315
et seq. Also see the Trebilcock Study, supra, note 7 at 331-332.
323 Trebilcock Study, supra, note 7 at 116. Also see Sebert, supra, note 23 at 722-
273.
324B.C. Act, s. 24. Cf. UCSPA, ss. 9(a)(3) and 9(b)(1).
325 B.C. Act, s. 24(1).
32 6 Id., s. 24(2).
327ld., s. 24(3)(b).
828 Id., s. 24(3) (c).
329 Id.
330 Alberta Act, s. 13(1); Saskatchewan Act, s. 16(1).
331 Supra, note 325.
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suggested that the Ontario Act was quickly becoming "rigid, close-minded
and restricted" was, if anything, guilty of understatement.838 2
5. The Criminal Sanction
Both the appropriateness and the effectiveness of the criminal sanction
in the enforcement of consumer trade practices legislation have been ques-
tioned.3 8 Nonetheless a consensus has emerged that while the criminal sanc-
tion ought not to be the primary enforcement tool, it has not outlived its
usefulness as a remedy of last resort. Most commentators have argued in
favour of retaining the criminal prosecution alternative to deal selectively with
the more abusive cases of deceptive or unconscionable trade practices where
effective deterrence is a desirable and attainable end.883 4 This writer shares
the view that the criminal sanction is a "clumsy regulatory device" '3 and
should be relegated, in the context of consumer protection legislation, to a
tertiary level. However, it should be retained and utilized whenever the sup-
plier who has engaged in a deceptive or unconscionable trade practice can be
shown to have done so knowingly, or without having taken all reasonable
precautions to avoid the commission of the violation.
Three of the provincial trade practices enactments have included a
general criminal offence provision.33 The fourth, the Alberta Act, has limited
the availability of the criminal sanction to three specific circumstances: refus-
ing to provide information required by the Director, providing false infor-
mation, and contravening any cabinet regulation that has prescribed an
information content for certain types of representations. 81 The more general
criminal offence provision can be found in the B.C., Ontario, and Saskatche-
wan legislation. The B.C. and Saskatchewan Acts make it clear that any
person who contravenes the Act or its regulations, refuses or fails to furnish
information as required under this Act, furnishes false information, or fails
to comply with any order or written undertaking of voluntary compliance
made pursuant to the Act, is guilty of an offence and is liable on summary
conviction to a fine not exceeding $5000 and/or to imprisonment for a term
of not more than one year.83 8 In the case of a corporate defendant, a fine
of up to $100,000 can be imposed. 39 A feature of the B.C. and Saskatchewan
criminal offence provisions that deserves emphasis is the conscious statutory
332 Mr. James Renwick M.P.P., Ont. Leg. Deb. (February 6, 1975) at 7373.
333 See generally Sebert, supra, note 23 at 745 and n. 230 for references to the
literature.
334 See, for example, Rothschild and Throne, Criminal Consumer Fraud: 4 Victim
Oriented Analysis (1976), 74 Mich. L.R. 661 at 690, 707; Geis and Edelhertz, suprer,
note 2 at 1005 and 1009; and Tracey, Consumer Protection: An Expanded Role for the
Local Prosecutor (1975), 44 U. Cincinnati L.R. 81 at 88-89.
335 Trebilcock Study, supra, note 7 at 45.
336 B.C. Act, s. 25; Ontario Act, s. 17; Saskatchewan Act, s. 18.
337 Alberta Act, s. 17.
338 B.C. Act, s 25(1); Saskatchewan Act, s. 18(1).
339 B.C. Act, s. 25(3); Saskatchewan Act, s. 18(3).
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effort to avoid an indiscriminate imposition of strict liability. Both statutes
permit a defence of "due diligence," i.e. that the commission of the offence
was due to a mistake, or to reliance on information supplied to the accused,
or to the act or default of another person, or to an accident or some
other cause beyond his control and that the accused took all reasonable pre-
cautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid the commission of the
offence.340 In sum, this means that a supplier who has engaged in an unfair
trade practice or has otherwise contravened the Act will be able to avoid
criminal liability if he can show that his conduct was reasonable throughout.
To impose strict criminal liability where all reasonable precautions have been
taken is a meaningless and counter-productive utilization of the criminal
sanction. An important study by the federal Law Reform Commission has
concluded that the minimum standard for criminal liability in all regulatory
legislation should be negligence and that an accused should not be convicted
of a regulatory offence if he establishes that he acted with due diligence; that
is, that he was not negligent.2 41 This recommendation appears to be an
eminently sensible one. The due diligence defence, combined with a reverse
onus of proof, is the appropriate compromise which will allow the legislation
"to meet the needs both of justice and of efficiency. ' '2 42 In this regard, the
B.C. and Saskatchewan enactments can be commended.
The Ontario Act, unfortunately, has gone too far in the opposite direc-
tion. Although the scope of the criminal offence provision is as broad as that
of the B.C. or Saskatchewan legislation, the Ontario Act requires a finding
that the defendant "knowingly" 343 contravened the legislation. This require-
ment for full mens rea unavoidably excludes the reckless or negligent supplier
whose unfair trade practices could effectively be deterred by an imposition of
criminal liability. The Ontario legislature should adopt the "due diligence"
approach discussed above.344 Until such time as this amendment is made, the
340 B.C. Act, s. 25A; Saskatchewan Act, s. 20.
341 Strict Liability: Working Paper No. 2 (Law Reform Commission of Canada,
1974) at 35. Also see Studies on Strict Liability (Law Reform Commission of Canada,
1974). The arguments supporting the recommendations of the Law Reform Com-
mission are basically the following: (1) The notion of strict liability and the re-
sulting prosecution of the morally blameless defendant are not consistent with the
traditional aims of the criminal law; punishment of the non-culpable defendant will
not further the objectives of retribution, rehabilitation or deterrence. (2) A regime of
strict liability wherein the morally blameless defendant is treated in the same way as
the morally blameworthy defendant will detract from the traditional stigma associated
with criminal conviction and generally reduce the efficacy of the criminal sanction.
(3) Studies of misleading advertising prosecutions show that in practice the strict lia-
bility provisions are ignored and prosecutions are launched only where blameworthy
conduct is evident. See Fitzgerald, Misleading Advertising: Prevent or Punish? (1970),
1 Dal. LJ. 246. Also see the excellent discussion of this issue in the Trebilcock Study,
supra, note 7 at 45-55.
8 4 Strict Liability, supra, note 341 at 37.
343 Ontario Act, s. 17(1). Section 17(2) has a similar requirement: "Every person
who engages in an unfair practice ... knowing it to be an unfair practice is guilty of
an offence .... "
244 The "due diligence" defence is not uncommon to consumer protection legisla-
tion. See, for example, the U.K. Trade Descriptions Act, supra, note 137, s. 24 and the
recently amended Combines Investigation Act, supra, note 3, s. 37.3(2).
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full mens rea requirement in the Ontario Act will ensure that the Ontario
criminal sanction remedy is only marginally more meaningful than that of
Alberta.3 45
C. EVALUATION AND SOME PROPOSALS FOR REFORM
One is tempted at this point to state the obvious: of the four provincial
enactments, the B.C. Trade Practices Act is indisputably the strongest con-
sumer trade practices statute in Canada and the Ontario Business Practices
Act the weakest. The latter has been touted by one Ontario legislator as "the
finest piece of consumer legislation ever introduced in [the] province and
indeed in the whole country."346 One could cynically accept the boast about
provincial excellence as simply a reflection of the inferiority of Ontario con-
sumer protection legislation generally. However, the suggestion that the On-
tario Act can aspire to national excellence is without foundation. Given the
many deficiencies and omissions already noted,3 47 the Ontario Act could
easily be a contender for the weakest trade practices enactment in North
America.348
A proper evaluation of comparable legislation is not concluded, how-
ever, by simply rating the various enactments. A more important and valuable
exercise is the attempt to sift through the various approaches taken by the
legislatures and develop a "model" trade practices enactment. Indubitably,
each of the statutes analyzed in this article has both strengths and weaknesses.
Even the Ontario enactment, which has been subjected to rigorous criticism
on several points, contained at least one feature that could beneficially be
considered by other provinces: the order for immediate compliance. 4 The
B.C. Act, which overall has been applauded, revealed several deficiencies
which fortunately were not copied in the other enactments. 350
It is submitted that a model trade practices statute can be developed
by discriminately aggregating the strong points of each of the provincial en-
actments that have been discussed. Once the model is drafted, however, an
equally serious effort must be made with respect to questions of publicity and
enforcement. Otherwise, a model "name-only" bill may be the only conse-
quence. Both of these concerns - the drafting of the legislation and its en-
forcement - have prompted this writer to suggest several proposals for reform
in the hope that the proposed amendments and alterations will attract serious
consideration.
345 Discussed supra, note 337 and accompanying text.
346 Mr. Frank Drea M.P.P., Ont. Leg. Deb. (February 7, 1975) at 7413.
3 47 Supra, Part B.
348 The specific criticisms relating to both the statutory design of the Act and to
governmental enforcement efforts are reviewed in this Part of the article.
349 Ontario Act, s. 7(1), supra, note 308 and accompanying text.
350 E.g., several important omissions in the "shopping lists" of deceptive and un-
conscionable trade practices: see, supra, notes 186-187 and accompanying text; also
recall our discussion of the court-oriented injunction procedure, supra, note 239 and
accompanying text.
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1. Drafting the Legislation: Six Areas of Concern
(a) Understandability
The drafting of statutes that are comprehensible to the non-lawyer is
particularly crucial in the case of consumer protection legislation. Laws en-
acted to provide consumers with substantive or procedural rights can only be
effective if they can be understood by the consumer. Regardless of the nature
and extent of the legislative protection offered, the threshold obligation of the
legislative draftsmen is to avoid arcane, obscure and unnecessarily legalistic
phraseology where simpler wording would do. It is difficult to comprehend
why provincial draftsmen persist in talking about "chattels personal,"3 51 or
what is gained by such obscurities as "the consumer is entitled to any remedy
therefor that is at law available. 35 2 If a consumer fair practices statute is
intended to "clarify the consumer's rights far more clearly than before,"353
surely clarity of expression is the minimal expectation. 54
(b) Reasonable Coverage
The scope of the B.C. Act provides a satisfactorily wide range of cover-
age and can serve as a provincial model.3 55 Such issues as the nature of the
conduct, the standard of deceptiveness, the types of goods and services in-
cluded, the abolition of horizontal and vertical privity, and the importance
of actual agreement have been explored in Part B; on each of these points
the B.C. Act provides a strong and sensible lead. The restrictions apparent
in the Ontario Act with respect to post-contractual abuses, lender-credit trans-
actions, and the types of "services" scrutinized by the legislation should be
avoided.3 o
351 Ontario Act, s. 1(f); Alberta Act, s. 1(f); Saskatchewan Act, s. 2 "goods."
352 Ontario Act, s. 4(1): discussed, supra, note 248 et seq. and accompanying text.
353 This objective is suggested in a publicity brochure distributed by the Ontario
Ministry of Consumer and Commercial Relations. See Balance in the Marketplace: The
Ontario Businessman's Guide to the Business Practices Act (Toronto: Ministry of Con-
sumer and Commercial Relations, 1975) at 2.
354 A Report of the Joint Commons - Senate Regulations Committee (tabled in
the House of Commons and Senate on January 31, 1977) has recommended that govern-
mental rules and regulations "be as intelligible and as explicable as possible and stripped
of their mystery." See Basic Rights Trampled by Ottawa, Report Says (Globe and Mail,
February 4, 1977 at 1). A similar concern that legislation be understandable was voiced
by Mr. James Renwick M.P.P. during the debate on the Ontario Act. His criticism of
the unnecessary legalistic obscurities was unrestrained:
I don't think there is a single consumer, when he sees this bill and tries to under-
stand it, who will possibly understand whether or not he's got a legal remedy in-
volved in it, without going to see a lawyer. I don't think he will have any sensa-
tion that he is being presented with an inexpensive, efficient method of deciding
a consumer complaint. I think we're involved in a kind of marshmallow world
of traditional legal conceptions that aren't going to help the consumer at all.
Ont. Leg. Deb. (November 28, 1974) at 5849.
355 Discussed, supra, Part B, note 50 et seq. and accompanying text.
350 Discussed, supra, Part B.
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(c) A Full Range of Civil Remedies
It has already been noted that the modem consumer trade practices
statute is intended to provide an integrated framework of civil, administrative,
and criminal remedies with recourse to the latter as a last resort. It has been
argued in this article that the civil or consumer-initiated remedies should be
emphasized and encouraged.357 The B.C., Alberta, and Saskatchewan statutes
provide a uniformly acceptable range of private remedies. The court is prop-
erly directed to respond with whatever remedy or combination of remedies
is deemed appropriate.3 58 It is evident that legislative direction and judicial
flexibility are the important guidelines in drafting a workable private remedies
provision. Both of these features are absent in the Ontario provision. Indeed,
except for the consumer-initiated rescissionary right, the Ontario Act's civil
remedies provision is a good example of what not to do. 5 9 Unnecessarily
restrictive, unduly obscure, and unfortunately non-progressive, s. 4 of the
Ontario Act requires a complete re-drafting. 0 0 In the course of such re-
drafting, Ontario would do well to include some direction respecting both
measure and types of damages recoverable. On this point the Saskatchewan
provision is helpful.801 Finally, to overcome the problem of financial disincen-
tives, a model statute would include a minimum recovery provision and
would provide for a mass redress or class action procedure. 02
(d) Effective Administrative Measures
The concern here is not with the Director's general investigatory and
related powers which are uniformly satisfactory in all of the provincial enact-
ments,-e but with the provision of substantive administrative remedies. The
first such remedy should be a Director-initiated cease and desist procedure.
Ontario's "order for immediate compliance" is particularly noteworthy and,
in the context of trade practice regulation, may prove to be more effective
than the court-oriented injunctive remedy found in the B.C. and Alberta
enactments.3 6 A voluntary compliance procedure is the next requisite. Pro-
vincial draftsmen should pay special attention to the specific AVC guidelines
found in the B.C. and Saskatchewan provisions.3 5 The final and indispens-
able administrative remedy is the substituted action. Of all the deficiencies in
357 Supra, note 214 et seq. and accompanying text.
338 B.C. Act, s.20(l)(c); Alberta Act, s. 11(2)(f); Saskatchewan Act, s. 15(2)(g);
and, supra, note 241 and accompanying text.
359 Discussed, supra, note 24 et seq. and accompanying text.
860 Id.
361 Saskatchewan Act, s. 15(2) (a); supra, note 263 and accompanying text.
362 Discussed, supra, note 267 et seq. and accompanying text.
363 Discussed, supra, note 290 et seq. and accompanying text.
364 Ontario Act, ss. 6 and 7. Supra, note 302 and accompanying text. The Com-
mercial Registration Appeal Tribunal is empowered by s. 6(6) to "attach such terms
and conditions to its order as it considers proper to give effect to the purposes of [the]
Act." Quaere whether this open-ended direction would permit the CRAT to order the
violator to make restitution to affected consumers. The constitutionality of the wider
power to award damages is discussed, infra, Part D.
365 Supra, note 320.
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the Ontario Act, the omission of a substituted action procedure is perhaps the
most serious. 06 A model act could easily adopt the provisions found in the
B.C. Act3 67 which, in permitting the Director's intervention both offensively
and defensively, are superior to the more restricted substituted action made
available in the Alberta and Saskatchewan enactments. 6 8 One final point:
the availability of these administrative remedies should not be made condi-
tional upon the Director first obtaining authorization from the Attorney-
General. This Alberta requirement 69 detracts from a potentially effective and
efficient program of enforcement by leaving it unnecessarily vulnerable to
political pressure and interest group lobbying.
(e) A Sensible Criminal Sanction.
The point has already been made that the most sensible criminal offence
provision in any regulatory statute, and particularly in a consumer trade
practices statute, is one that bases liability upon a negligence standard and
permits a "due diligence" defence.370 Model provisions can be found in the
B.C. and Saskatchewan enactments.3 71 Alberta's failure to provide a general
criminal sanction and Ontario's insistence on full mens rea are deficiencies
that must be avoided.372 It has been suggested that while recourse to the cri-
minal sanction is appropriate for deceptive or misleading trade practices, it
should not be imposed where the violation is one that involves an "un-
conscionable" act or practice.373 Because the nature of an unconscionable
practice is ill-defined, by terms such as "excessively," "grossly," and "un-
due,"374 it may be more appropriate to require, as a minimum, proof of full
mens rea in this area. The issue is not easily resolvable. On balance, the non-
differentiating approach of the B.C. and Saskatchewan provisions is prefer-
able. The "due diligence" defence would provide a satisfactory protection to
those suppliers whose conduct was found to be in violation of the unconscion-
ability categories. The concern for more precise definition is better served
by a process of administrative rule-making than by a further relegation of the
criminal sanction.
(f) Rule-Making Powers
In a consumer trade practices enactment, it is particularly desirable to
provide a procedure for the issuance of trade regulation rules which will de-
fine with greater specificity the kinds of conduct that will be deemed a viola-
tion of the "shopping list" categories. The complaint that the provincial decep-
tive and unconscionable "shopping list" enumerations are unduly imprecise
866 Discussed, supra, note 332 and accompanying text.
8 67 Supra, note 324.
8 68 Supra, note 330.
869 Alberta Act, s. 19 (1) and, supra, note 318 and accompanying text.
370 Supra note 342 and accompanying text.
3 71 Supra, notes 338-339.
372 Supra, notes 337, 343 and accompanying text.
873 Ziegel, Enforcing a Consumer Bill, Globe and Mail, May 23, 1974 at 7.
374 E.g., Ontario Act, ss. 2(b) (ii) (v) and (viii).
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and, thus, unhelpful to the business community is a valid one. A comprehen-
sive rule-making procedure would provide an efficient mechanism for the
particularization of unfair trade practices.7r Although two of the provincial
trade practices enactments do provide a regulation-making power which
enables the Lieutenant Governor-in-Council to add new categories to the
"shopping lists,"376 this should not be confused with the power to issue binding
interpretive trade rules which would give content to the existing and, some
say, sufficiently wide categories.
Rule-making powers have been provided in the consumer trade prac-
tices legislation of at least twenty-eight American jurisdictions.3 77 The actual
rule-making authority is generally vested in the Attorney-General or some
other appropriate ministerial department.37 8 Should Canadian jurisdictions
provide similar power, the rule-making authority could well be the Minister
responsible for consumer affairs and for the enforcement of the trade prac-
tices legislation. One model for provincial enactments is the United King-
dom's Fair Trading Act,379 which contains a comprehensive rule-making pro-
cedure involving a three-stage screening process: the Director submits his
proposals for desirable trade regulation rules to a Consumer Protection Ad-
visory Committee consisting of representatives from industry, consumer
groups, and government; the Advisory Committee studies the requests and
determines which are sufficiently justifiable for recommendation to the Sec-
retary of State; the Secretary of State receives the Committee's report and has
the sole authority to promulgate rules through orders made by statutory in-
strument reviewable by Parliament.380 Whether the provincial trade practices
legislation should provide the necessary procedural fairness by adopting the
U.K. triple-screening procedures or by developing a more formalized public
hearing machinery is a question of secondary import. What is of primary
concern is that some rule-making powers be available to the appropriate
Minister or enforcing authority.35 1 The advantages of an even-handed and
definitionally valuable rule-making power have been thoroughly reviewed in
.175 Sebert, supra, note 23 at 710 and 718. Also see the excellent discussion of rule-
making powers and their potential in trade practices regulation in the Trebilcock Study,
supra, note 7 at 148-164.
370 B.C. Act, s. 32(n) (o); Ontario Act, s. 16(1) (c). Supra, notes 203-205 and
accompanying text.
377 Trebilcock Study, supra, note 7 at 117: Alaska, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware,
Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Louisiana, Maine, Maryland, Massa-
chusetts, Minnesota, Montana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Dakota,
Ohio, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Utah, Vermont, West Virginia and
Wisconsin.
78Id. at 118. In Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii and Louisiana, for example, the rule-
making authority is vested in the Director of Consumer Protection with the concurrence
of the Attorney-General and an appointed Consumer Advisory Board.
379 1973, c. 41. (U.K.).
3s0 See Trebilcock Study, supra, note 7 at 157-159.
381 The suggestion that a rule-making power be given to an appropriate provincial
agency or tribunal is considered, infra, Part D.
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the literature. 382 It is hoped that provincial draftsmen will regard the rule-
making power as one of the drafting priorities suggested herein.
2. Enforcing the Legislation: Lessons from B.C. and Ontario
Absent an effective program of enforcement, a model consumer trade
practices statute would quickly deteriorate into yet another example of legis-
lative pollution8 s 3 The line dividing legislative symbolism and legislative
substance is often nothing more than a governmental commitment to publi-
cize and enforce the legislation. To date, three provinces have enacted and
are enforcing a consumer trade practices statute.3 14 Because Alberta's entry
into this field of regulation is too recent to provide any empirical basis for
comment,380 the discussion herein will be limited to the problems encountered
by the B.C. and Ontario enforcing authorities. In my view there are important
lessons to be learned from the efforts and experiences of both provinces in
the implementation of their respective trade practices enactments.
The first lesson relates to the question of enforcement. Consumer pro-
tection in the public sector has been aptly described as "woefully under-
staffed and underfinanced, morassed in a sea of red tape and unbearably slow
acting." 386 Although this description is considered typical of most consumer
law enforcement programs,3 8 7 the B.C. experience has provided a unique and
refreshing exception. Its enforcement record reflects a properly staffed, hard-
working trade practices division supported by a clear governmental commit-
ment to make its trade practices legislation meaningful to British Columbia
consumers.388 By contrast, the Ontario enforcement program is depressingly
familiar and falls easily within the above-mentioned description being both
woefully understaffed and unbearably slow acting. One need only compare
the data arising out of the first year of enforcement in both B.C. and Ontario.
3 2 Supra, note 375.
383 The tendency of federal and provincial governments to enact legislation that
is often unnecessary thus straining the courts and generally polluting the legislative
landscape, has attracted the attention of leading Canadian jurists. When sworn in as
Chief Justice of the Ontario Supreme Court, Estey C.J.O. suggested that Canadian legis-
latures "have been hyperactive ... cranking out any and all kinds of legislation, whether
it is needed or not." See Courts Strained by Unnecessary Legislation, Estey Says, Globe
and Mail, February 8, 1977 at 1. For a general exploration of this theme see Walls,
An Overgoverned Society (New York: The Free Press, 1976).
384 Supra, note 4.
385 The Alberta Act was proclaimed in force January 1, 1976. The B.C. Act was
proclaimed in force July 5, 1974, and the Ontario Act on May 1, 1975.
38 Travers and Landers, supra, note 228 at 812, quoted in Shea, Toward Effective
Consumer Law Enforcement: The Capacity to Deceive Test Applied to Private Actions
(1975), 10 Gonzaga L.R. 457 at 458.
387 Mooney, The Attorney General as Counsel for the Consumer: The Oregon
Experience (1975), 54 Ore. L.R. 117 at 160; Sebert, supra, note 23 at 759; Shea, supra,
note 386 at 458, n. 6.
388See the Department of Consumer Services Annual Report 1975 (Province of
British Columbia, 1975). During 1975, the B.C. Department of Consumer Services
handled 8,027 consumer complaints and was able to obtain some $375,000 in rebates
and refunds for consumers. Also see, infra, notes 389-397.
1977]
OSGOODE HALL LAW JOURNAL
Although Ontario's population is nearly three and one-half times greater than
B.C.'s,38 9 its enforcing authority has a staff that is effectively less than one-
third the size of that in B.C.890 and the enforcement data for a comparable
time period reflects the unfortunate consequences for Ontario consumers of
this glaring disparity. 9 1
A similar disparity is evident in the commitment of the B.C. and Ontario
governments to the question of publicity and consumer education. Indeed, one
explanation for the inaction and ineffectiveness of the Ontario trade practices
authority may well be the fact that the vast majority of Ontario consumers are
totally unaware of the Business Practices Act. Publicity of the Ontario Act
consisted of a limited distribution of a four-page pamphlet. 92 No attempt
whatsoever has been made to publicize the existence of the legislation in any
meaningful manner. By contrast the B.C. publicity efforts "have been nothing
short of frenzied." 93 A major consumer education programme was launched
to publicize the existence and implications of the B.C. trade practices statute.
In addition to an extensive media advertising campaign, a twenty-page bro-
chure describing the Act was sent to every household in the province.89 4
Requests for various publications resulted in the mailing of over 137,500
pieces of literature including education kits, brochures, and fact sheets to B.C.
consumers. As well, the first full year of operation saw the trade practices
staff undertake 450 speaking engagements at various public meetings.896 This
389 Population figures at April 1976 were as follows: Ontario - 8,315,000 and Bri-
tish Columbia - 2,486,000. See (1976), 51 Can. Stat. Rev. at 24.
390 The Ontario Business Practices Division of the Consumer Protection Bureau
currently has four full-time staff lawyers. Their responsibilities are not limited to the
enforcement of the Ontario Act but extend to twelve different consumer protection and
registration statutes. See, for example, the legislation, supra, note 295. The British Co-
lumbia counterpart employs four lawyers on a full-time basis and several others on specific
retainer. Law students working part-time and during the summer months provide further
support. See Annual Report, supra, note 388 at 23.
391 Compare the performance of B.C. and Ontario under their respective trade
practices legislation:
B.C. Ontario
AVC's 22 4
Injunctions 4 10 (cease and
desist orders)
Substituted Actions 6 0
Prosecutions 1 3
The disparity is accentuated by the fact that the B.C. figures are for a twelve month
period ending December, 1975, while the Ontario figures are for an eighteen month
period ending February, 1977. B.C. data: see the Annual Report, supra, note 388 at
51. Ontario data: conversation with Mr. David I. Radford of the Business Practices
Division.
392Supra, note 353. A companion pamphlet was entitled Balance in the Market-
place: The Consumer's Guide to the Ontario Business Practices Act (Toronto: Ministry
of Consumer and Commercial Relations, 1975). There was a limited distribution to
selected public libraries.
893 Zysblat, supra, note 160 at 100.
894 Id.
895 Annual Report, supra, note 388 at 30 and 49.
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commitment to consumer education as both an informative and a preventive
device is, of course, shared by most progressive consumer protection bu-
reaux""" and reflects the growing realization that consumer education should
not be an ancillary but a primary function of the consumer protection
authority.39 7
Why is this commitment lacking in Ontario? What is the explanation for
the profound divergence between B.C. and Ontario with respect to both en-
forcement and publicity? One Ontario legislator, a member of the Opposi-
tion, suggested that "when the consumers of this province complain in the
future about the lack of action in certain areas, we will direct them to read
the debates .... ,,398 This reference to the repeated refusal of the Minister to
permit reasonable amendments to the Ontario Acts 99 is only a partial ex-
planation of Ontario's current level of general inaction. The more important
reason for the under-enforcement and lack of publicity is funding. The
Ontario government has simply not provided an adequate budget for an
effective trade practices regulation programme. 400 To a large extent, this is
consistent with its non-progressive attitude in the drafting and the debate of
the Ontario Act, and will continue to ensure that at least one provincial trade
practices enactment will remain a name-only legislative gesture.
D. RETHINKING TRADE PRACTICES REGULATION:
AN ALTERNATIVE
Thus far, the analysis and evaluation of provincial trade practices legis-
lation has proceeded upon the assumption that the primary "quality control
agency" 401 in the battle against deceptive and unconscionable trade practices
should be the court. Indeed, most of the commentators that have hitherto
3 9 0 Kazanjian, supra, note 23 at 422. The State of Washington's consumer educa-
tion effort deserves special emphasis:
In the State of Washington, a full-time "Consumer Education" staff has been
added to the Attorney-General's Consumer Protection Division . . . this office
prepares a weekly column for a number of state newspapers; participates in a bi-
weekly half-hour television program, "Law in Action"; contributes to local news
telecasts on a regular basis; and assists local police departments in establishing
procedures for dealing with low-income consumer problems ... the utilization of
the media by the Washington Attorney-General has involved no cost to the tax-
payers of that State. Thousands of dollars of free broadcasting time have been
obtained as a result of the sophisticated rapport created with the commercial radio
and television stations by the Consumer Protection Division. (at 422).
307 Id. I share Professor Ziegels caution, supra, note 1 at 204, that consumer educa-
tion "is no universal solvent, no magic wand that effaces the harsh realities." But it is
one of the weapons that can be deployed in the battle against marketplace abuses.
398 Mr. Albert Roy M.P.P., Ont. Leg. Deb. (February 7, 1975) at 7413.
899 Discussed, supra, Part B.
40 0 Mr. R. Simpson, Executive Director of the Business Practices Division, estimated
the operating budget for all features of the Ontario Act to be approximately $300,000.
(Conversation: March 14, 1977.) The British Columbia legislature allocated nearly
$587,000 for implementation and enforcement of the B.C. Act. (Correspondence with
the Director of Trade Practices, July 9, 1976).
401 This phrase appears in Leff, supra, note 197 at 354.
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participated in the study of trade practices regulation in Canada have un-
hesitatingly endorsed what could be described as a litigational model, with
the court occupying the predominant position in the regulatory structure.402
Increasingly, however, and especially in the area of trade practices regu-
lation, the argument is being made that a curial body may be wholly in-
appropriate in a regulatory framework whose object is the effective and
efficient regulation of marketplace trade practices. This suggestion that the
reliance being placed upon the courts be re-evaluated and that the advantages
of the specialized administrative body be reconsidered seems to reflect at least
four concerns. The first is simply a realization that a judiciary long-steeped in
the traditional presumptions of the common law may be unduly reluctant to
interpret and apply innovative consumer protection legislation with the vigour
it deserves. The fear that a court insensitive to legislative spirit may thwart
legitimate enforcement efforts may be justified given several recent decisions
in British Columbia wherein one can detect some judicial unresponsiveness
to the legislative guidelines in the trade practices enactment. 40 3 The second
concern about the litigational model is also related to questions of effective-
ness. An argument has been made that judicial "case-by-case sniping" 4" 0 is
both an expensive and frustrating mechanism for the regulation of market-
place abuses and that a specialized administrative agency would be better able
to cope with the open-textured quality of the "shopping list" enumerations by
utilizing a rule-making power to provide some specificity. 03 Related to this
concern about the effectiveness of litigation is the more general question of
access to justice. One commentator has suggested that "if the consumer is
given rights and remedies that must be asserted in a court... we may just
402 See, for example, Waddams, supra, note 190 at 391 and at 393, n. 62. A simi-
lar endorsement of the curial model is suggested in the Trebilcock Study, supra, note
7 at 172.
403 In Hanson, Director of Trade Practices v. John's Tax Services (B.C.S.C., March
5, 1975, not yet reported) the Director sought to enjoin the defendant's "income tax
refund discounting" practice on the ground that the transactions entered into with
unsuspecting consumers were so harsh and adverse to the consumer as to be inequitable
and thus unconscionable (s. 3 (2) (e) of the B.C. Act). McKay J., however, dismissed
the application stating that more information about the type of individual who utilized
the defendant's service was necessary for a finding of unconscionability, and he did so
notwithstanding the fact that the provincial cabinet had passed a regulation pursuant to
s. 32(o) of the B.C. Act directed specifically at tax refund discounting. See B.C. Reg.
134/75 (Order-in-Council 562, Feb. 6, 1975).
In Director of Trade Practices v. Household Finance Corp. of Canada, [1976] 3
W.W.R. 731, the Director sought both declaratory and injunctive remedies against the
defendant on the ground that the finance company's studious efforts to hide from the
consumer the fact that his conditional sales contract had been assigned to the finance
company was a deceptive act or practice. The trial judge d missed the applications
holding that a practice of non-disclosure which did not lead the consumer into an error
of judgment is not a deceptive practice (at 736-737). The judgment was affirmed on
appeal (B.C.C.A., March 16, 1977, not yet reported). The Court of Appeal agreed that
the B.C. Act did not require disclosure of the financing arrangements made between
merchants and finance companies.
404 Leff, supra, note 197 at 358.
4O5Infra, notes 411-413 and accompanying text.
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as well do nothing. ' 406 The final concern, expressed by Professor Leff, is
one that questions the very nature of the consumer bargaining process and
the ubiquitous adhesion contract. He has suggested that most consumer con-
tracts should be thought of as "products" just as the products sold pursuant
to them; 407 this view of the "contract as thing" 408 would emphasize govern-
mental regulation as simply "quality control" not requiring judicial involve-
ment.
The arguments favouring regulation by a specialized administrative agency
have been voiced by Kenneth Culp Davis:
A court is passive. It has no obligations to search for evidence which parties fail
to present. A regulatory agency has an affirmative duty to carry out a program,
to protect a public interest which frequently is otherwise unrepresented. When
parties fail to produce needed facts, the regulatory agency typically must take
the initiative in aggressively making its own factual investigation. Unlike a court,
a regulatory agency employs staffs of specialists, wields independent powers of
investigation, and accumulates vast storehouses of information about its special-
ized field.4 0 9
Other commentators have also emphasized the advantages of expertise, effi-
ciency, and effectiveness, particularly with respect to trade practices regula-
tion.410 The rule-making powers that were considered earlier411 could, in the
context of an administrative tribunal, take on even greater significance. The
trade practices agency could assume rule-making procedures similar to those
of the Federal Trade Commission, 41 issuing advisory opinions, policy state-
ments, and industry guides, as well as binding trade regulation rules.413 These
directives would provide a helpful particularization of the shopping-list cate-
gories and would assist in the development of a coherent and consistent
policy regarding questions of trade practices regulation.
Should the provinces adopt the specialized agency model for the regula-
tion of consumer trade practices? First of all, one should appreciate how the
administrative agency model would fit within the context of the existing trade
practices legislation. The Ontario framework provides an easy illustration.
4
o6 Shuchman, Profile on Default: An Archival Study of Automobile Repossession
and Resale (1969), 22 Stan. L.R. 20 at 53, cited in Leff, supra, note 197 at 355, n. 30.
4o7 Supra, note 197 at 352, n. 18.
408Leff, Contract as Thing (1970), 19 Am. U.L.R. 131.
409 Davis, Official Notice (1949), 62 Harv. L. Rev. 537 at 537-538, quoted in
Connelly, Exclusive Dealing and Tied Selling Under the Amended Combines Investiga-
tion Act (1976), 14 Osgoode Hall L.J. 521 at 563.
410 See, for example, Sebert, supra, note 23 at 748 and Harrison, supra, note 23 at
431.
411 Supra, note 377 et seq. and accompanying text.
4 12 For an overview of the FTC ral e-makine nrneednrem ,en Tintnar and Smith-
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The existing Commercial Registration Appeal Tribunal,414 which in the con-
text of the Business Practices Act reviews the issuance of cease and desist
orders,415 could be re-structured to assume an even greater jurisdiction with
respect to the provision of civil and administrative remedies. The Tribunal is
already empowered to attach "such terms and conditions" to its review of the
Director's cease and desist order "as it considers proper, to give effect to
the purposes of [the] Act.' 416 Presumably this would permit the provision of
restitutionary relief.41 To expand this jurisdiction to allow a completely flexi-
ble remedial capacity, including the awarding of damages, would not require
a substantial re-structuring. The addition of a rule-making procedure similar
to that used by the FTC would also be feasible. The only theoretical or struc-
tural difficulty that might impede the provincial draftsman is a constitutional
one.
The administrative agency's capacity to award damages may be chal-
lenged as being in violation of s. 96 of the British North America Act 418
which has been judicially interpreted as prohibiting a provincial legislature
from "investing a tribunal with jurisdiction of a kind which ought properly
to be exercised by a superior, district or county court. '419 Although recent
decisions have prompted one constitutional scholar to suggest that "there is
no reason to suppose that section 96 difficulties have frustrated the develop-
ment of administrative tribunals in the provinces,"' 4 0 the question of damage
awards may provoke a less sympathetic constitutional interpretation.421
414 Established by s. 7 of The Department of Financial and Commercial Affairs Act,
R.S.O. 1970, c. 113, renamed by S.O. 1972, c. 1, s. 23(l) as The Ministry of Consumer
and Commercial Relations Act.
415 Ontario Act, ss. 6-7.
41 6 Id., s. 6(6).
417 Supra, note 364. Also see Ziegal, supra, note 373 at 7.
418 1867, 30 & 31 Vict., c. 3 (U.K.); R.S.C. 1970, App. II, No. 5. Section 96 pro-
vides as follows: 'The Governor-General shall appoint the Judges of the Superior,
District and County Courts in each Province, except those of the Courts of Probate in
Nova Scotia and New Brunswick."
419 Hogg, Is Judicial Review of Administrative Action Guaranteed by the British
North America Act? (1976), 54 Can. B. Rev. 716 at 717. The literature on the extent
and implications of the judicial interpretation of s. 96 is collected at 717, n. 4.
420 Id., at 718. Professor Hogg refers to the decisions of the Supreme Court of
Canada in Tremblay v. Commissions des Relations de Travail du Quebec, [1967] S.C.R.
697 and Tomko v. Labour Relations Board (N.S.) (1975), 69 D.L.R. (3d) 250. Both
are unequivocal illustrations of a more lenient, perhaps pragmatic, approach to ques-
tions involving provincial board powers and the limitations imposed by s. 96. For a
recent example see Jones v. Board of Trustees of Edmonton Catholic School District
School District No. 7 et aL (1976), 70 D.L.R. (3d) 1 (S.C.C.).
42 1 The constitutionality of a provincial enactment investing a provincial tribunal
with the power to award damages has not been tested. Unlike the labour injunction or
the trade practice cease and desist order, the damages remedy might be characterized
as a traditional judicial function more appropriately exercised by judges appointed pur-
suant to s. 96. This constitutional uncertainty may have been the reason behind the
recommendation of the Ontario Law Reform Commission's Report on Consumer War-
ranties that the provincial tribunal "should have the power to make an order for resti-
tution but not for general damages." Supra, note 81 at 120.
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The original question, however, was whether the specialized administra-
tive agency model was attractive in principle. Of the forty-eight American
states that have enacted trade practices legislation,42 2 eight have chosen to
place enforcement powers in an independent agency.423 My own hesitation in
this matter is a hesitation which stems from a general reluctance to rely too
heavily on bureaucratic regulation largely because most regulatory bodies
have a "marked life cycle."
In youth they are vigorous, aggressive, evangelistic and even intolerant. Later
they mellow, and in old age-after some ten or fifteen years-they become,
with some exceptions, either an arm of the industry they are regulating or
senile.42 4
In my view, the most appropriate and indeed the most effective regula-
tory framework with respect to consumer trade practices might well be a
combination of the litigational and administrative agency models. The com-
plementary inter-weaving of court and agency would provide a double-
barrelled and highly flexible regulatory technique.
An agency invested with rulemaking authority could concentrate on elaborating
illegal practices in specific trades under the deceptive practices law and could
apply these rules to individual cases through assurances of discontinuance or
cease-and-desist orders where these means were sufficient. In more extreme cases, the
attorney general could seek more stringent sanctions in the courts, such as
injunctions, receivership, or dissolution. Both the agency and the courts could be
authorized to order restitution to known victims of the deceptive practice, thus
encouraging the submission of complaints from the public. Jurisdictional conflicts
between the agency and the attorney general would not be unlikely. But assuming
that a reasonably tolerable working relationship developed, a spirit of competition
between these two authorities might well stimulate more creative approaches to
commercial regulation.4 25
Whether or not provincial trade practices legislation adopts this combi-
nation of "quality control agencies" or chooses one to the exclusion of the
other, is a question that is secondary to the overall obligation to re-think
the contemporary approaches to trade practices regulation. One cannot con-
tinue to presume the superiority of the litigational or court-oriented model.
A rigorous intellectual analysis of the appropriateness or inappropriateness of
the suggested alternatives must be undertaken. This search for alternatives
should be characterized by a realization that judicial processes cannot alone
rectify pervasive consumer injustices.426
422 Supra, note 23.
423 California (Director of Consumer Affairs); Louisiana (Division of Consumer
Protection); Maryland (Division of Consumer Affairs); Montana (Department of Busi-
ness Regulation); Nevada (Commissioner of Consumer Affairs); Ohio (Director of
Commerce); Utah (Trade Commission); Wisconsin (Commissioner of Banking). See
Harrison, supra, note 23 at 430, n. 187.424 Galbraith, The Great Crash (Boston: Houghton Miffin, 1961) at 171. The
"capture theory" of regulatory agencies has attracted a large literature. An interesting
Canadian perspective is presented in Trebilcock, Winners and Losers in the Modern
Regulatory System: Must the Consumer Always Lose? (1975), 13 Osgoode Hall L.J. 619.
425 Comment, Developments in the Law - Deceptive Advertising, (1967), 80 Harv.
L.R. 1005 at 1134.
426 Note, Non-Traditional Remedies for the Settlement of Consumer Disputes, supra,
note 23 at 395.
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The ultimate objective of most consumer advocates is to create a set of institutions
which enable the consumer to be sovereign in the marketplace. No goal so far-
reaching is attained by enactments of a single rule of law, the grant of a single
remedy or the creation of a single procedural mechanismA27
The recent abundance of legal commentary calling for the creation of new
non-curial mechanisms for the resolution of consumer disputes428 reflects a
healthy commitment to the oft-forgotten notion that "law is not solely or even
centrally an affair for courts."' ' 9 A similar commitment to a re-thinking of
the public enforcement structure of trade practices legislation would be equal-
ly refreshing and rewarding.
E. CONCLUSION
The recent provincial venture into the area of comprehensive consumer
trade practices regulation is to be welcomed. The social, psychological, and
economic harms that are a consequence of unfair and deceptive business
practices have been documented in the literature. 430 No society should toler-
ate marketplace abuses, particularly where the most vulnerable victim is often
the low-income consumer whose experience with the unscrupulous business-
man reinforces his increasing sense of helplessness, frustration, and out-
rage.431 Unquestionably, society has a duty to deliver "a civilized brand of
civil justice. ' ' 432 In many respects the provincial trade practices legislation is
a commendable step in this direction. The real question, however, is whether
this legislative effort will be matched by a requisite governmental commitment
to implementation and enforcement.
427 Travers and Landers, supra, note 228 at 834.
4 28 Supra, note 426. Also see Eovaldi and Gestrin, supra, note 10, and Jones and
Boyer, Inproving the Quality in the Marketplace: The Need for Better Consumer Reme-
dies (1971-72), 40 Geo. Wash. L.R. 357.
429 Cahn and Cahn, Power to the People or the Profession? - The Public Interest
in Public Interest Law (1970), 79 Yale L.J. 1005 at 1017.
430 See, supra, note 426 at 385, n.5 for the most recent itemization of the relevant
studies and articles.
431 "A baffling frustration in achieving simple consumer justice still constitutes one
of the most demoralizing features of low income life in America ... " Lovett, supra,
note 216 at 274. In 1967 the U.S. National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders
concluded that "consumer grievances-real or imagined-were one of twelve major
grievances that contributed to the sense of alienation, tension and frustration that made
rioting and civil unrest a stark reality in our cities." Supra, note 426 at 385, n.5. Also
see Rothschild and Throne, supra, note 334 at 675: "Given the day-to-day frustrations
and indignities of ghetto life, the victim of criminal consumer fraud in the inner city
may come to perceive street crime as his only means of economic survival, emotional
survival, emotional escape or moral retribution."
432 Rosenberg, Devising Procedures That Are Civil to Promote Justice That is
Civilized (1971), 69 Mich. L.R. 797 at 808.
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Unfair Trade Practices
Drafting a sensibly progressive trade practices statute is, of course, the
threshold prerequisite. Various combinations of rights and remedies may be
attempted. Indeed, a major part of this article has been devoted to such a
statutory analysis and several proposals for reform have been suggested. 433
Throughout this analytical exegesis, however, the importance of an effective
enforcement programme has never been in doubt. Without a properly funded
and adequately staffed public enforcement authority, even our "model" act
will gradually but inevitably sink to "name-only" status. By the same token,
the badly drafted Ontario Act "could, if effectively employed, become one
of the most promising bulwarks against the manipulation of consumers by
dishonest and unscrupulous businessmen."4
34
The difference between substance and symbolism in trade practices regu-
lation is most often attributable to such factors as budget and publicity. The
two are obviously inter-related. An effective publicity campaign to inform
consumers of new rights and remedies will require a generous budgetary
allocation. The resulting awareness on the part of consumers may impose
increasing administrative and enforcement costs upon the governmental au-
thority, requiring even more funding. This inter-relationship will not go un-
noticed by a non-progressive provincial government that sees consumer educa-
tion as an unnecessary luxury that could precipitate a deluge of consumer
complaints. The irony is that an effective publicity campaign to educate con-
sumers with respect to new rights and remedies under the trade practices legisla-
tion would encourage greater recourse to privately initiated redress procedures
and, thus, provide a regulatory complement to public enforcement efforts.1 5
The effort to inform or educate the consumer with respect to a recently
enacted trade practices statute is nothing less than a reflection of the provin-
cial government's commitment to a meaningful program of consumer protec-
tion.430 Equally revealing is the effort to re-evaluate and, where necessary,
reform the structural deficiencies in the legislative framework.437 Without this
combined perspective of effective enforcement and legislative review, the
paramountcy of symbolism over substance becomes inevitable. Should this
materialize, consumerism will confront one of its greatest challenges to date:
433 Supra, Parts B and C.
43 4 Ziegel, supra, note 373. (Emphasis added.)
435 Supra, notes 215-216 and accompanying text.
436 This is not to say, however, that the effort to inform and educate should be
used as a rationalization for inaction in other consumer protection efforts. Consumer
education is but one of the tools available to the enforcing authority: it is not a "uni-
versal solvent." Supra, note 397 and accompanying text.
4371 share Professor Aaron Director's perspective that "every extension of state
activity should be examined under a presumption of error." Director, The Parity of the
Economic Marketplace (1964), 7 J. Law & Econ. 1 at 2, quoted in Epstein, supra, note
196 at 294, n. 3.
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the realization that "government . . . has been the biggest consumer fraud
around."4 3
8
This article has attempted to provide some direction for those provincial
governments that are determined to avoid this criticism.439 One would hope
that no government would seriously run the risk of attracting allegations that
its trade practices statute is itself an unfair and deceptive act or practice.
438 Mr. Herbert Denenberg, Commissioner of Insurance for the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania, in a speech to the 1973 Conference of the New York Consumer Assembly:
Government has more power than it can use. It merely lacks the will and guts to
use it. Our experience indicates that government, as it conventionally operates,
has been the biggest consumer fraud around.
Quoted, infra, note 439 at 75.
439 A consumer research group has already completed an extensive investigation of
one government's consumer protection efforts with results that tend to confirm the sug-
gestion, supra, in note 438. See Schulman and Geesman, Deceptive Packaging; A Close
Look at the California State Department of Consumer Affairs, (San Francisco: San
Francisco Consumer Action, 1974).
